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Abstract 
 
It is claimed that private property rights in carbon assets will both reduce carbon 
emissions and will increase investment in sequestration activities, thereby mitigating the 
effects of or solving climate change. Supposedly, property rights acting in a carbon 
market will assist emitters in transitioning to lower-emissions technology while creating 
an incentive for land managers to engage in rights-creating sequestration activities. This 
thesis focuses on biological sequestration and shows that property rights in carbon assets 
will hinder, rather than facilitate, carbon policy success.  
 
This thesis begins with an examination of whether it is appropriate to assign property 
rights to a natural cycle. Because of the physical, legal, and moral inability to exclude 
others from the carbon cycle, this thesis rejects private property rights in carbon assets, 
which represent a portion of the carbon cycle. However, as regulators desire to actively 
manage the carbon cycle, the common justifications of private property are reviewed to 
determine whether any of these property theories can justify the creation of private 
property in carbon assets. Private property rights in carbon assets are rejected as the 
rights, and the consequences of the rights, are contrary to society‘s social, legal, 
administrative, and environmental goals. Ultimately, carbon policies are more likely to be 
successful when carbon assets are held publicly rather than privately. 
 
The conclusion of this thesis is significant as numerous governments have considered, or 
are considering, the creation of private property rights in carbon assets. Further, it is not 
evident that an academic analysis has previously been undertaken to determine whether 
creating property rights in the carbon cycle is appropriate or whether a property approach 
will reduce atmospheric carbon concentrations. The analysis in this thesis can play a role 
in creating successful and sustainable carbon policies.  
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO CARBON ASSETS AND 
THE CASE FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CARBON ASSETS 
 
1.0  Introduction 
Climate change is, at its essence, an environmental problem; an excess of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases has led to the global temperature rising and the global temperature is predicted 
to continue to rise with current or increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases.
1
 Although an 
environmental problem, mitigating and / or solving climate change requires more than a 
consideration of environmental issues. Climate change is a massive, international issue. It is the 
consequence of a history of environmentally destructive behaviours which have become 
engrained in society.
2
 Solving climate change will require a coordinated, multifaceted approach 
which results in all of the players in carbon change, the emitters, who have and are releasing 
harmful greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, the sequesterers, who store atmospheric 
greenhouse gases and reduce the atmospheric concentration of GHGs, and society generally, 
which bears the consequences of emission and sequestration activities, routinely practicing 
environmentally sustainable behaviours.   
Property rights
3
 in carbon assets
4
 have been proposed as a way to inconspicuously and 
positively change the relationship between society and carbon. Policy makers are creating private 
property in a portion of the carbon cycle in a hope that property rights operating in offset markets 
will discourage emitters from emitting and entice sequesterers into engaging in sequestration 
activities.
5
 However, it is not evident that an academic analysis has been undertaken to determine 
                                            
1
 United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change, ―Feeling the Heat: Climate Science and the Basis of 
the Convention‖ (2012), online: <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/the_science/items/6064.php>. 
2
 For example, driving personal vehicles rather than using public transportation or walking and society‘s current 
norm of ―consumerism‖.   
3
 ―Property‖ does not mean ownership, although ―ownership‖ may be significant. This thesis defines property as the 
relationships between individuals stemming from the rights and obligations derived from an interest in a res. This 
definition of property encompasses the ownership, bundle of rights, and relationship models of property. See, for 
example, Felix Cohen, ―Dialogue on Private Property‖ (1954) 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357 at 378 and Kevin Gray & 
Susan Francis Gray, ―The Idea of Property in Land‖ in Susan Bright and John Dewar, eds. Land Law: Themes and 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 15. 
4
 A term used by Steven A. Kennett, Arlene J. Kwasniak and Alastair R. Lucas, ―Property Rights and the Legal 
Framework for Carbon Sequestration on Agricultural Land‖ (2005-06) 37 Ottawa L. Rev. 171 to describe 
―sequestration potential, carbon sinks, sequestered carbon and sinks-based offsets‖. 
5
 See Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law (Toronto: Carswell, c. 2010) at 77 for a discussion on how property can 
be used for social engineering.  
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whether private property rights
6
 in carbon assets are appropriate or whether a property approach 
can successfully reduce atmospheric carbon concentrations. Private property in carbon assets was 
promoted as a potential solution to climate change prior to a complete examination of property 
theory and sustainable carbon policy. It is curious that this should have happened.  
The creation of private property in carbon assets is based on two propositions: the first 
from economic theory, that market forces will achieve least-cost reductions in emissions and 
increases in sequestration;
7
 and the second being the property theory principle that people cannot 
transfer property rights which they do not own.
8
 By locating private property in carbon assets, 
property interests can be created, bought, sold, banked, cashed in, destroyed through use, and 
retired.
9
 The presumption is that property rights in carbon assets, capable of being created by 
entrepreneurs and transferable in a market, will encourage investment and locate the property 
interest in the person willing to pay the most for the interest. For example, if land managers
10
 can 
create economically valuable ―carbon credits‖ from sequestering carbon, land managers will 
have an incentive to engage in activities which sequester carbon. Further, if carbon dioxide 
emitters are legally required to either reduce emissions or purchase carbon credits to offset 
emissions, emitters will govern themselves in the most economically efficient way while 
incidentally reducing carbon emissions or supporting carbon sequestration activities.  
                                            
6
 Private property organizes property rights around the idea of individual ownership (Jeremy Waldron, The Right to 
Private Property (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1988) at 38). Ownership presumes that most uses of property are self-
regarding, or that no one other than the owner has a legitimate claim to the control of the property (Joseph Singer, 
Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) at 3-4). The bundle of rights 
model, however, tempers the ownership model‘s approach to private property and allows each right associated with 
a resource to be held by a different individual. Pursuant to the bundle of rights approach, the private property rights-
holder may, as allowed by her right, do with her right as she pleases to the full exclusion of all others.  
If carbon assets are held as private property, property rights in carbon would be assigned to a right-holder. 
The right-holder could sequester, release, and emit carbon, and buy, sell, bank, cash in, retire, destroy, or abandon 
carbon rights as allowed by her property right and as may be restricted by the rights of others. No definite 
actualization of private property in carbon assets can be provided as an example, although most are currently in the 
form of a recognized carbon credit or equivalent. This thesis will not analyze the possible property rights regimes for 
sequestration transactions. Numerous theorists have already looked at how common law and statutes could be used 
should property in carbon exist.
 
See, for example, Kennett et al., supra note 4 and Kenneth L. Rosenbaum, Dieter 
Schoene and Ali Mekouar, Climate Change and the Forest Sector: Possible National and Subnational Legislation 
(Rome: Food and Agriculture Agency of the United Nations, 2004), online: 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5647e/y5647e00.pdf>. 
7
 Ronald Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1988).  
8
 Kennett, supra note 4 at 176. 
9
 See, for example, Heather Hager, PhD, ―Carbon Sequestration and Carbon Credits,  Top Crop Manager, online: 
<http://www.topcropmanager.com/content/view/4240/> which describes how three aggregators purchased offsets 
from individual farmers who participated in reduced-tillage projects and sold these offsets to industries in Alberta, 
―much like a grain elevator buys and sells grain‖.  
10
 ―Land managers‖ is used throughout this thesis to refer to the persons who make land management decisions, and 
thus are in control of the land‘s sequestration potential, carbon sinks, and sequestered carbon. 
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As will be shown, the desire to use market forces to achieve carbon emission reduction 
and climate change mitigation goals is motivating the creation of private property in carbon 
assets both domestically and internationally.
11
 Yet, property theory finds that private property in 
carbon assets is inappropriate. Forcing carbon assets into the private property framework, rather 
than allowing them to function as non-property or common property, is causing the property 
rights in carbon assets to behave in an unpredictable manner in the market. Private property 
rights in carbon offsets are failing. Legislators continue, however, to create private property 
rights in carbon assets to function in carbon markets.  
 
1.1 The Use of Property Rights in Climate Change Strategies 
 There is a fear that current global efforts are not capable of adequately addressing climate 
change.
12
 For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (―IPCC‖) estimated that 
                                            
11
 See, for example, jurisdictions such as Alberta (Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, 2003, cC-16.7, 
s. 9) and Australia (Samantha Hepburn, ―Carbon Rights as a New Property: Towards a Uniform Framework‖ Sydney 
Law Review, forthcoming, online: <law.anu.edu.au/news/Hepburnseminarpaper.doc>). See also the Clean 
Development Mechanism [―CDM‖], at Article 12, IPCC (2007) and the Seventh Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [―Marrakesh Accord‖], United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties, 7
th
 Sess., Addendum, Part Two: action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume 1, Decision 11/CP.7, UN Doc. FCCP/CP/2001/13/Add.1, online: 
United Nations <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf>,  allowing Annex 1 countries to include carbon 
fluxes that resulted from revegetation, cropland management and grazing land management when calculating their 
net greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Article 3(4) of the Kyoto Protocol [―Kyoto‖], Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 
ILM 22 (1998). 
 There are two main forms of carbon trading markets: ―cap and trade‖ and ―offsetting‖ (Tamra Gilbertson 
and Oscar Reyes, ―Carbon Trading: How it works and why it fails‖ (November 2009) 7 Critical Currents, online: 
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation <http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/carbon-trading-booklet.pdf> 
at 9-11). In cap and trade, permits to emit to a certain prescribed level are created by the state and distributed to 
industry. Normally, the industry is assigned a maximum emissions limit, and each producer in that industry is 
allocated its own specific maximum limit. Emitters who emit less carbon than allowed by regulation and/or the 
emission permits they possess are able to trade their created or unused permits to those emitters who expect to emit 
more than allowed by regulation and/or the permits they possess. So permits are treated as commercial property 
rights by their holders and others in that industry. Environmental success under the cap and trade market occurs 
when the emissions cap is reduced, signalling a reduction in total emissions.  
 The premise of offsetting is very similar to cap and trade, but permits can be created from emissions-saving 
and emissions-mitigating projects, such as revegetation, cropland management and grazing land management, to 
offset emissions and reach emission obligations (Gilbertson, ibid. at 9-11. See also Kennett, supra note 4 at 173). 
Biotic carbon assets will not be relevant in a cap and trade market because emissions may not be offset in this 
market. However, biotic carbon assets may be integrated into a carbon offset market. 
12
 This thesis is not intended to be a broad debate about global warming. As such, I set out the propositions about the 
science of carbon which I accept without further examination.  
1. Climate change is a consequence of an excess concentration of atmospheric Green House Gases [―GHGs‖].  
2. Forestry, revegetation, cropland management and grazing land management are activities that have the 
potential to sequester carbon;  
3. Biotic carbon sequestration reduces the level of atmospheric GHGs and should be encouraged; 
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there would need to be a rapid 50 to 70 percent reduction in emissions to avert devastating 
climate change.
13
 The IPCC figures are considered by some to be an underestimate.
14
 Another 
study concludes that ―30 Kyotos‖15 would be required to stabilize the concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere.
16
  
 Although the obvious solution to climate change is ―[f]oregoing excessive use of fossil 
fuels‖,17 most likely through prohibitive regulation, this strategy is not desirable to many.18 
Market-based approaches, a more popular option for dealing with climate change,
19
 have been 
advanced in an effort to continue current consumption while simultaneously reducing reliance on 
fossil fuels. Stern, a proponent of the use of market instruments to address climate change, 
submits that climate change has occurred because the market does not put a price on carbon, thus 
carbon is not taken into account when persons make economic decisions. The failure to include 
the costs of climate change in market transactions is ―the greatest market failure the world has 
ever seen‖.20 To rectify the market failure, Stern recommends creating a price for carbon through 
tax, trading or regulation.
21
   
Market-based approaches, with their associated property rights, do not immediately halt 
behaviours which are connected to climate change. Instead, they attempt to limit the severity of 
                                                                                                                                            
4. The environmental benefits of biotic carbon are located in carbon sequestration potential, carbon 
sequestration, and the retention of carbon reservoirs; and, 
5. Plant biomass and soil organic matter constitute a part of the carbon cycle feasible for contemplating 
property rights. While some ideas presented in this thesis may be relevant to carbon at other stages of the 
carbon cycle, the intention of this thesis is to only deal with property rights in carbon assets, being 
sequestration potential, carbon sinks, sequestered carbon and sink-based offsets. 
13
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Second Assessment: Climate Change 1995, IPCC, Geneva, 
1995.  
14
 James Hanse, Makiko Sato, Pushker Kharecha, David Beerling, Robert Berner, Valerie Masson-Delmotte, Mark 
Pagani, Maureen Raymo, Dana L. Royer, James C. Zachos, ―Target atmospheric CO2: Where should humanity 
aim?‖(2008) 2 Open Atmos. Sci. J. 217. 
15
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998) [―Kyoto‖]. 
16
 David Malakoff, ―Thirty Kyotos Needed to Control Global Warming‖ (Dec 19, 1997) 278(2) Science 2048.  
17
 Gilbertson, supra note 11 at 8. 
18
 Ibid.  
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Nicholas Stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (HM Treasury: London, 2006) online: 
National Archives <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm> at viii. 
21
 Ibid. at viii. Contrary to Stern, who advocates for the use of market instruments which puts a price on carbon to 
deal with climate change, Jim Watson argues a market price for carbon ―is a very poor weapon in what is supposed 
to be a war to save humanity‖ (Gilbertson, supra note 11 at 12). As a reference, the increase in the price of oil in the 
1970s did little to discourage industry from using oil (Gilbertson, ibid. at 12). Instead, industry passed the increased 
costs onto the consumer. The use of oil did not decrease, thus the environment did not benefit from increased oil 
prices. 
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climate change by allowing or promoting only those behaviours which are deemed by the 
market, and any accompanying legislation, as being worthwhile and/or significantly discouraging 
those that are not. For example, putting a price on carbon through the use of tradable carbon 
permits has the potential to spur beneficial efficiencies. If legislation requires a person to possess 
a carbon permit to produce, distribute or consume fossil fuels, and these permits can be bought 
and sold, those who would benefit from producing, distributing, or consuming fossil fuels at a 
higher carbon-price would purchase carbon permits to allow them to engage in their activity 
while those who would not benefit at the higher carbon-price would not undertake their 
activities. Those who choose to emit at a higher carbon price would also have the ability to adopt 
lower emissions technology to reduce their reliance on carbon credits. By making fossil fuels 
more expensive, carbon permits are expected to reduce the use of fossil fuels and promote the 
transition to energy efficient practices, or so is the presumption.   
 Prior to the use of market instruments to address climate change concerns, private 
property did not exist in carbon assets. Private property rights in carbon assets are now being 
created for use in carbon markets as part of legislators‘ climate change policies. Carbon trading, 
rather than reliance on any other market or regulatory instrument, such as carbon taxes, is a 
popular policy choice: ―Carbon trading lies at the centre of global climate policy and is projected 
to become one of the world‘s largest commodities markets‖.22 For carbon trading to take place, 
market instruments, as well as economic theory generally, require that private property be held 
somewhere, and that this property be capable of being transferred. Hepburn states: ―Climate 
change is a market failure without parallel, on the ‗greatest scale the world has seen‘, so it is not 
surprising that the [emissions trading scheme] created to address it should eventually be seen as 
representing the world‘s greatest ever privatization of a natural asset‖.23  
The failings of carbon markets have been well documented, yet policy analysts and 
legislators accept carbon markets and private property in carbon assets as the correct response to 
climate change.
24
 To date, three carbon markets have been prominent: the European Union‘s 
Emissions Trading System (―EU-ETS‖), the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
                                            
22
 Gilbertson, ibid. at 103. 
23
 Cameron Hepburn ―Carbon Trading: A Review of the Kyoto Mechanisms‖ (November, 2007), 32 Annual Review 
of Environment and Resources 375 at 389. 
24
 As seen in chapter 2, Canada, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec have all 
created or examined the creation of private property rights in carbon assets and the use of carbon markets to control 
emissions. 
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Scheme (―GGAS‖), and the Chicago Climate Exchange (―CCX‖). As explored further in chapter 
3, each of these markets, as well as numerous other environmental markets, has ―failed‖ in some 
way. Even though carbon markets are not meeting societal goals, regulators are attempting to 
identify and fix problems with carbon markets rather than abandon carbon markets in their 
entirety.
25
 
Assumptions are being made that carbon markets are failing because the terms of the 
program or market have been badly designed or have been badly implemented. For example, 
Kennett et al. advocated for certainty of rights relatively early in the international community‘s 
interest in carbon markets
26
 and described the scientific, technical, economic, legal and 
institutional challenges associated with carbon assets as including ―issues such as project design, 
measurement and verification of carbon fluxes, direct and opportunity costs of sequestration 
projects, monitoring and enforcement of sequestration agreements, risk management, project 
‗leakage‘ and transaction costs‖.27 Boydell et al. subsequently identified ―the tension between the 
legal and economic interpretation of real property rights‖ as being the reason Australian property 
rights in carbon have not succeeded and proposed ―a reconstitution of [carbon] property as a 
‗web of interests‘.‖28 In November, 2009, Gilbertson and Reyes held carbon market failure, 
specifically the failure of the European Union‘s Emissions Trading System, was associated ―with 
a complex interaction of state and corporate power, where those with the loudest voices in the 
process push for offsetting as a means to escape their responsibility to change industrial practices 
and the means of power production domestically.‖29 
Although Kennett et al., Boydell et al., and Gilbertson and Reyes make compelling 
arguments, these theorists do not address the real problem. It is not uncertainty of program 
terms,
30
 the description of carbon property as a profit à prendre,
31
 or the unjustifiable influence 
                                            
25
 Nicholas Linacre, Alexandre Kossoy and Phillippe Ambrosi, ―State and Trends of the Carbon Market‖ Carbon 
Finance at the World Bank (Environment Department: Washington DC, June 2011), online: 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Trends_Updated_June_2011.pd
f> at 9. 
26
 Kennett, supra note 4.  
27
 Ibid. at 174. 
28
 Spike Boydell, John Sheehan, & Jason Prior, ―Carbon Property Rights in Context‖ (2009) 11 Environmental 
Practice 105.  
29
 Gilbertson, supra note 11 at 89. 
30
 Kennett, supra note 4 at 174 
31
 Boydell, supra note 28.  
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of government actors and market proponents that are causing carbon markets to fail.
32
 Instead, as 
this thesis will show, carbon markets and current carbon policies are not working because carbon 
assets are not the proper subject of property. As natural cycles are not the proper subjects of 
property, any private property rights erroneously assigned to natural cycles will not act in a 
predictable or sustainable manner. Further, private property rights in carbon assets distort what 
are and are not relevant interests and issues. Describing carbon dioxide emission-driven climate 
change as a ―market problem‖ or a ―property problem‖ ignores the need for structural and 
behavioural changes. Clarifying program terms, re-characterizing carbon property, and 
preventing undue influence will not fix the problems experienced by the markets. Carbon-
focused environmental policies will not be successful as long as carbon is associated with legal 
property rights. 
Prior to examining whether it is appropriate to create private property rights in carbon 
assets, the terms of the debate, namely ―carbon assets‖, must be defined. The term ―carbon 
assets‖ is rarely used and does not have a generally accepted definition, rendering it meaningless 
out of context. As is seen below, because of the numerous ways the carbon cycle and property 
can be linked, having a basis of reference is essential.  
 
1.2  What are Carbon Assets? 
This thesis focuses on carbon assets related to biological sequestration,
33
 being 
sequestration potential,
34
 carbon sinks,
35
 sequestered carbon,
36
 and sinks-based offsets.
37
 
Defining sequestration potential, carbon sinks, sequestered carbon, and sinks-based offsets as 
                                            
32
 Gilbertson, supra note 11 at 89. 
33
 ―Sequestration - The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir other than the atmosphere. 
Biological approaches to sequestration include direct removal of carbon dioxide from 
the atmosphere through land-use change, afforestation, reforestation, and practices that enhance soil carbon in 
agriculture.‖ International Panel on Climate Change, Glossary of Terms used in the IPCC Third Assessment Report, 
online: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/tar-ipcc-terms-en.pdf> 
[―Third Assessment‖]. 
34
 Kennett, supra note 4 at 178 defines sequestration potential as ―the ability of soil and vegetation that can be grown 
on the land to absorb and retain atmospheric carbon‖. 
35
 ―Sink - Any process, activity or mechanism that removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol, or a precursor of a 
greenhouse gas or aerosol from the atmosphere.‖ Third Assessment, supra note 33 [emphasis removed]. 
36
 Kennett, supra note 4 at 178 defines sequestered carbon as ―carbon actually retained by the soil and its 
vegetation.‖ 
37
 The World Bank describes offsets as: ―Offsets designate the emission reductions from project-based activities that 
can be used to meet compliance—or corporate citizenship—objectives vis-à-vis greenhouse gas mitigation.‖ 
Linacre, supra note 25 at 77. Continuing this line of thought, a sinks-based offset would be a designated credit 
created from sequestration project-based activities that can be used to meet compliance objectives.  
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―assets‖ is a legal fiction. However, similar to recognizing a business‘s goodwill as an asset, 
there may be reasons why intangibles should be distinct from other closely-connected property 
interests. In the case of carbon, on one hand, biotic carbon is so closely connected to property 
rights in land and vegetation that the economic value of carbon – a component element – is 
difficult to separate.
38
 On the other hand, Coase
39
 and Stern
40
 both argue that a price must be put 
on carbon to combat climate change. Putting a price on carbon sinks requires the ability to 
separate the value of the sinks from the distinct value of the trees which form the sinks. As the 
goal of current carbon offset markets is to promote investment in carbon sinks, rather than to 
promote investment in trees, this thesis accepts that sequestration potential, carbon sinks, 
sequestered carbon and sinks-based offsets can be considered ―assets‖. The question, however, is 
should these assets be given or treated as having ―property‖. 
There is no settled legal classification of what property rights in the ―carbon asset‖ 
portion of the carbon cycle would resemble.
41
 The following diagram sets out the possible 
classifications of property interests in carbon:
42
  
 
 Briefly explaining this chart, property interests are either real property or personal 
property. Real property is a right in land.
43
 Real property interests are either corporeal, interests 
capable of possession such as freehold estates, or incorporeal, interests which are non-possessory 
in nature such as easements or profits à prendre. Personal property is an interest in a thing other 
                                            
38
 Generally, one cannot separate rights in the plastic in a basketball from the rights in the basketball in its entirety. 
39
 Coase, supra note 7.  
40
 Stern, supra note 20. 
41
 See chapter 2 for further information on the carbon cycle.  
42
 See, for more information, Ziff, supra note 5 at 77.  
43
 Ibid. at 74. 
Real 
Property 
Personal 
Property 
Corporeal Incorporeal Chattels 
Personal 
Chattels 
Real 
Choses in 
Action 
Choses in 
Possession 
Leases 
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than land.
44
 Personal property can either be chattels real, contracts regarding leasehold interests, 
or chattels personal. Tangible chattels personal are described as choses in possession and 
intangibles are choses in action. As property rights in carbon assets are still in their infancy, the 
remainder of this section examines what the nature of property rights in carbon assets could be.  
Answering the question of whether real or personal property should exist in carbon assets 
depends on the part of the carbon cycle the legislator is trying to promote, protect, or exclude 
others from. It is a decision about whether society is interested in encouraging the process of 
sequestering carbon or the product of the sequestered carbon. The process and product of carbon 
sequestration are interconnected, yet attract different property rights. This would be similar to 
intellectual property law in patents where a process may qualify for patent law rights and 
protection, while the resultant product is governed by other property law.  
Property in the sequestration process need not necessarily be an interest in land. In 
Alberta, the sequestration activity, not the product, is being recognized by the creation of 
personal property in carbon offsets.
45
 If a land manager plants seedlings, the process of 
sequestering carbon (the planting) is separate from the product of sequestering carbon (the tree). 
Consequently, the personal property offset created to recognize the efforts of a land manager in 
planting seedlings does not prevent the land manager from clearing the land the next year by 
burning the young trees or otherwise from managing the property rights in the trees as he 
pleases. Since the property interest in the offset is separated from the vegetation and biomass in 
                                            
44
 Ibid. at 74.  
45
 Alberta‘s Compliance Carbon Offset Market creates private property in Offsets, rather than an interest in land or 
in tangible property. As such, I would classify the property right in the Offset as a chose in action. The following is a 
short explanation on the creation and transfer of Offsets: 
All projects registered on the registry must be third party verified by a chartered accountant or 
professional engineer with relevant expertise in the project area. The third party verifier will issue 
a verification report including a signed statement of verification, statement of qualifications and 
conflict of interest checklist, which must be submitted to the registry as part of the supporting 
documentation for the offset project. The registry will perform a completeness check on all 
documents submitted, and may request clarification or corrections if errors are detected. Once all 
supporting documents and payment are received, the registry will issue unique serial numbers for 
the verified emission reductions and/or removals. 
 
Offset credit transactions occur outside the registry and are done through contractual agreement 
between the buyer and seller. Transfer of ownership of serialized credits is tracked by the registry 
and will be submitted to Alberta Environment upon request to support offset credit reviews as part 
of the regulated facility compliance reviews… 
Alberta Environment, Technical Guidance for Offset Project Developers (January 2011), online: 
<http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7915.pdf> at 12.  
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which carbon is stored, it does not protect the product of sequestration and may not be capable of 
―offsetting‖ emissions, as intended.46  
If property rights in carbon are created to promote the products of carbon sequestration, 
an interest in land can serve as the indestructible ―host‖ of the carbon.47 For climate change 
mitigation purposes, the value of a carbon sink is in its physical existence, not in the protection 
of a legal fiction represented by a piece of paper, the piece of paper most likely being an offset 
credit. Environmental benefits are only achieved if carbon sinks remain once created. If a real 
property interest is not created in a carbon sink, i.e. the interest is created through a contract, a 
land manager may sell the land on which the sink is based and the new land manager may 
destroy the sink. The sink owner might then be compensated by the person who was in breach of 
the contract by economic damages,
48
 but the environmental benefit is lost without any other 
environmental compensation. By not creating real property in carbon assets, the true purpose of 
the creation of the sink is being ignored and left to be easily defeated.  
Some governments, such as British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario, seem 
to be attempting to take control of carbon markets and are defining property in carbon assets 
through legislation and / or program criteria. However, the current state of property rights in 
carbon assets in Canada is a disorganized hodge-podge of far-from-clear property rights. Thus, 
this thesis identifies possible carbon property rights in carbon as either: 
1) connected only to the sink, likely as an incorporeal right, a chose in possession 
right, or a chose in action right; 
2) connected only to the sinks-based offset, likely as a chose in action right, and 
therefore separate and distinct from the carbon sink; or 
3) an incorporeal right, a chose in action right, or a chose in possession right and an 
additional chose in action right created in the same sequestration activity (thus the 
sink-based offset could be destroyed without affecting the property right in the 
carbon sink, or vice versa).   
                                            
46
 For further discussion on this point, see section 3.3 of this thesis.  
47
 See, for example, the Australian states of New South Wales, Queensland, and Tasmania who have created real 
property interests in carbon.  
48
 If carbon is considered personal property that is not affixed to the land, the property could be protected by the 
torts of conversion and trespass, the criminal laws of trespass and mischief, and contract law.  
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This thesis will attempt to distinguish, whenever possible, between the three ways property rights 
in carbon can be held. However, imitating legislators and other theorists, particularly in 
theoretical discussions, property rights are discussed in abstract, rather than classified.  
 
1.3 Outline 
Private property rights in carbon assets are not appropriate and are causing carbon 
markets to fail. To come to this conclusion, this thesis shows in chapter 2 that it is not proper to 
create property in a natural cycle. Although the thesis determines that the carbon cycle cannot be 
physically, legally, or morally excluded, thus is not the proper subject of property, regulators 
have created property rights in the carbon cycle anyway. Thus, chapter 3 canvasses property 
theory to determine whether any influential justifications of private property can provide validity 
to the creation of property rights in carbon assets. Because private property in carbon assets is 
rejected based on market failures, chapter 4 explores whether private property rights in carbon 
assets could be successful even in a perfect market. As chapter 4 concludes that private property 
in carbon assets is not legitimate and must be abandoned to achieve legal, administrative, 
environmental, and social goals, chapter 5 provides alternatives to private property in carbon 
assets that can be used to realize the climate change goals of promoting and protecting carbon 
sinks.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
Some policy strategists support the use of market forces to create incentives for 
participation in sequestration activities
49
 and prospectors see carbon trading as an economic 
opportunity.
50
 Currently, the market approach, which requires some form of carbon property 
right capable of being held by a private person, is not meeting resistance from society or 
                                            
49
 Ingrid Liepa of Alberta‘s Climate Change Central identified three possible models of markets: 
1. Private Model – owner of facilities subject to GHG emission limits purchase offsets that meet 
government criteria from parties that have sequestration capacity or that act as intermediaries in 
offset transactions;  
2. Trust Model – facility owners pay a set amount of money for each ton of emissions to be offset to a 
trust organization that is established to find and manage offset projects; 
3. Emissions Trading Model – government establishes a GHG emissions trading  system for the 
purchase and sale of carbon credits in a transparent market. 
Ingrid Liepa, Greenhouse Gas Offsets: An Introduction to Core Elements of an Offset Rule (Calgary: Climate 
Change Central, 2002) at s. 3.0, App. A, online: 
<http://www.climatechangecentral.com/resources/discussion_papers/GHG_offsets. pdf>.  
50
 Hager, supra note 9. 
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governments, and is, in Canada, generally the policy choice for carbon management.
51
 Thus, 
understanding the connection between carbon sequestration strategies and property rights is 
necessary.  
The present alternative of creating private property in carbon assets is not consistent with 
models of property theory, and traditional ideas of property are not capable of promoting carbon 
sequestration and sink retention to the extent believed to be required to mitigate or solve global 
warming. Private property rights in carbon assets as the basis of offset markets are causing offset 
markets to fail, to the detriment of societal goals.  
  
                                            
51
 See for example the Marrakesh Accord, supra note 11, where Annex 1 countries may include carbon fluxes that 
resulted from revegetation, cropland management and grazing land management when calculating their net 
greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to Article 3(4) of Kyoto, supra note 15. See also Environment Canada, Climate 
Change Plan for Canada (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002) at 39-40. See also Alberta Environment, Albertans 
and Climate Change: Taking Action (Edmonton: Alberta Environment, 2002) at 35-37, online: 
<http://www3gov.ab.ca/env/climate/docs/takingaction.pdf>. 
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CHAPTER 2: NATURAL CYCLES ARE NOT RIGHTLY PROPERTIZED 
 
2.0  Introduction 
Carbon markets and carbon policies are not achieving society‘s environmental and 
related legal, social, and administrative goals because natural cycles—carbon assets representing 
one segment of the carbon cycle
52—are not the proper subject of property, whether it be private 
property, common property,
53
 collective property
54
 or some mixture thereof.
55
 Achieving the 
intended goals of carbon policies depends on correctly characterizing carbon assets as non-
property. 
An example of the way in which incorrectly advanced property rights can prevent society 
from achieving success is seen by the Jamestown Settlement. The Jamestown Settlement, the site 
of the first English settlement in America, was organized around a common garden. The 
common garden, as common property, was intended to feed the Settlement, but failed in this 
function. In May of 1611, when the colonists should have been planting the garden, the newly 
appointed governor of the Jamestown Settlement arrived to find nothing planted except for 
                                            
52
 For a further explanation of the science of carbon, see section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
53
 In a common property regime everyone who stands in relation to the common resource has a right to use the 
resource and no one has a right to exclude other individuals of the group from the resource (Michael A. Heller, ―The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets‖ (1998) 111(3) Harv. L. Rev. 621 at 
622). Neither the interests of a particular individual in the group nor the interests of the group as a whole stand in a 
privileged position in common property (Waldron, supra note 6 at 41). Instead, ―rules governing access to and 
control of material resources are organized on the basis that each resource is in principle available for the use of 
every member alike‖ (Waldron, supra note 6 at 41).  
Common property differs from non-property as in common property the resource is identifiable to a 
particular group. In non-property, which is occasionally referred to as open access property, everyone has the right 
to use the resource.  
Common property in carbon would resemble the treatment of carbon prior to carbon emission credits 
becoming of interest – Canadians would not be able to exclude other Canadians from releasing or sequestering 
carbon within Canada, but could claim some sort of right internationally to carbon within Canada.  
54
 In collective property, a type of common property, the needs and purposes of the whole are taken into 
consideration in the management and use of a resource. The interests of the whole take priority over the needs and 
interests of individuals (Waldron, supra note 6 at 40). The difference between common property and collective 
property is the management of the property. In common property, all members of the society are allowed to use the 
resource. In collective property, a management team decides the best use of the resource. For example, on Indian 
Reserves, the Band Council or elders come together to decide how reserve land is to be used.  
In collective property, the government would determine access to and use of carbon, including the 
sequestration and the release of carbon. The government could control carbon through incentive programs or 
subsidies, regulation, carbon taxes, or a deposit system. Collective property would make the public responsible for 
the costs of investing in carbon sinks, but the collective would receive both the environmental and economic 
benefits of any sequestration or decreased emission which occurs. 
55
 For example, corporations and partnerships have elements of both common and private property, and land trusts 
and conservation easements are a mix of all three types of property.  
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―some few seeds put into a private garden or two‖ and ―their daily and usuall [sic] workers, 
bowling in the streets‖.56 The workers were content to spend their days bowling while they faced 
the imminent danger of starving to death. Only after the common garden was divided into small 
private gardens did the settlers begin actively pursuing the production of food. Thus, only when 
divided into private property interests did the garden function to meet its intended goals. 
Incorrectly described property rights in the garden caused the Settlement to fail, as will 
inappropriately described private property rights in carbon assets cause carbon policies to fail.  
 
2.1 The Carbon Cycle is not a Proper Subject of Property 
2.1.1 Locke 
As early as 1690, Locke held that it was without dispute that natural cycles cannot be 
owned.
57
 Moreover, the common law states there can be no ―absolute permanent property‖ in 
fire, light, and air,
58
 which, although not biogeochemical cycles, are analogous to the carbon 
cycle. An underpinning concept of property theory is that the ―spontaneous hand of nature‖ is 
non-property.
59
  
Pursuant to Locke‘s theory, a tree can be owned as the tree is the product of the 
―spontaneous hand of nature‖. The tree is property as a tree; the carbon in the tree is an essential 
component element of the tree, but not distinct property from the tree. The sequestration 
potential of the tree and the carbon sink the tree creates, however, are a part of a natural carbon 
cycle, thus not capable of garnering property rights separate and distinct from the res which they 
form. 
This idea is further explored by Kwasniak and Hursh in relation to the water, or 
hydrological, cycle.
60
 A clear distinction is made between the potential property rights in the 
                                            
56
 See Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975), 
online: Northwest Arkansas Community College 
<http://faculty.nwacc.edu/abrown/WesternCiv/Articles%5Cjamestownfiasco.pdf>. 
57
 John Locke, ―Of Property,‖ Second Treatise on Government, Chapter 5, in John Locke: Two Treatises of 
Government, edited with notes and introduction by Peter Laslett, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
285 at 286-7: 
And though all the Fruits it naturally produces, and Beasts it feeds, belong to Mankind in common, 
as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature; and no body has originally a private 
Dominion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind in any of them, as they are thus in their natural state. 
58
 Kevin Gray, ―Property in Thin Air‖ (1991) 50(2) The Cambridge Law Journal 252 at 257.  
59
 Locke, supra note 57 at 286-7. 
60
 Arlene J. Kwasniak & Daniel R. Hursch, ―Right to Rainwater – A Cloudy Issue‖, 26 Windsor Rev. Legal & Soc. 
105. 
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hydrological cycle and collected rainwater, a product of the hydrological cycle. Kwasniak and 
Hursh do not recognize property rights in falling rain and are inconclusive about whether there 
are private property rights in rainwater once collected.
61
 In any event, the authors argue that 
governments should override any claims of private property rights to the products of the 
hydrological cycle due to the potential consequences of altering the hydrological cycle.
 62
 Natural 
cycles, as per Locke‘s theory, are meant to remain available for the commons and not reserved to 
and controlled by private individuals.   
 
2.1.2 Wilberforce 
In National Provincial Bank Ltd. v. Ainsworth, Lord Wilberforce stated that before a right 
or interest can be admitted into the ―category of property, or of a right affecting property‖, it 
must be ―definable, identifiable by third parties, capable of its nature of assumption by third 
parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability‖.63 The following description of the 
science of the carbon cycle demonstrates how this cycle lacks permanence, as well as the ability 
to be defined, identified, and assumed. As a result, any property rights corresponding to a portion 
of the carbon cycle will also suffer from these same defects.  
 Carbon, a key component element from which all life is based, is found on Earth in five 
―storage‖ forms: dissolved in the ocean, as gas in the atmosphere, as organic molecules in 
organisms, as organic matter in soil, and as fossil fuels and sedimentary rock.
64
 Carbon exists in 
a cycle, being released from and stored in its five forms through numerous mechanisms. For 
example, carbon can leave the ecosphere through decomposition of organic soil matter or 
through respiration, in which the carbon-based molecules are broken down into carbon dioxide 
by organisms. Carbon can leave the atmosphere through diffusion from the atmosphere into the 
oceans and through autotrophic
65
 organisms converting carbon dioxide into carbon-based sugar 
molecules that are stored in the organism or are passed down the food chain to heterotrophic
66
 
organisms. Carbon can be released from the lithosphere by actions of volcanoes but, as a 
miniscule amount of carbon is released by volcanic action, the natural exchange of carbon 
                                            
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 National Provincial Bank Ltd. v. Ainsworth (HL) [1965] AC 1175 at 1247-8.  
64
 Michael Pidwirny, ―Carbon Cycle‖ (May 31, 2010) The Encyclopedia of Earth, online: 
<http://www.eoearth.org/article/Carbon_cycle>. 
65
 Organisms, such as green plants, capable of making nutrients from inorganic materials.  
66
 Organisms who obtain food by digesting plant or animal matter, as opposed to making their own nutrients.  
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between the lithosphere and the atmosphere is virtually nonexistent. Humans, however, through 
the production and burning of fossil fuels, unnaturally release carbon into the atmosphere that 
should be, and otherwise would be, locked in the lithosphere, thus disrupting the natural balance 
of the carbon cycle.
67
  
 Disrupting the carbon cycle is proving to have disastrous consequences. The Earth‘s 
temperature is correlated with the concentration of greenhouse gases (―GHG‖), carbon dioxide 
being a primary GHG, in the atmosphere; as the concentration of atmospheric greenhouse gases 
rise, so does the global temperature.
68
  The global temperature has increased by 0.74°C since the 
late 1800s and is expected to rise by another 1.8°C to 4°C by the year 2100.
69
 The effects of 
Earth‘s warming are projected to be devastating; as just one example, if the global temperature 
rises by more than 1.5°C to 2.5°C it is anticipated that 20-30 percent of plant and animal species 
are at risk of extinction.
70
 Although climate change is an environmental issue, it impacts all 
spheres of human life, including poverty, economic development, population growth, sustainable 
development, and resource management.
71
 In an attempt to mitigate or avoid the consequences of 
climate change, efforts are being made to restore some of the carbon which was unnaturally 
emitted into the atmosphere through carbon sequestration activities.   
 Carbon assets, being carbon potential, carbon sinks, sequestered carbon and sinks-based 
offsets, are the portion of the carbon cycle where carbon is stored as organic molecules in 
organisms and as organic matter in soil.
72
 An increase in the amount of carbon stored in 
organisms and soils correspondingly decreases the amount of carbon located elsewhere in the 
cycle. There is great potential to store atmospheric carbon in biotic carbon sinks. For example, 
the amount of carbon currently locked in forest ecosystems is larger than the amount of carbon in 
                                            
67
 Pidwirny, supra note 64. It is this excess carbon dioxide, an atmospheric greenhouse gas, that is linked to global 
warming. 
68
 Supra note 1. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change, ―Background on the UNFCCC: The International 
Response to Climate Change‖ (2012) online: <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php>. 
72
 This thesis only addresses biological sequestration that occurs through a process called photosynthesis. In 
photosynthesis, a plant converts water and carbon dioxide into oxygen, which the plant releases, and carbon- based 
sugars, which the plant stores in its tissue. The carbon that is stored in the plant is said to be in a ―reservoir‖, as it is 
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circumstances, the carbon content of the soil is increased when plant biomass is incorporated into the organic matter 
of the soil when a plant dies (―Biomass - The total mass of living organisms in a given area or volume; recently dead 
plant material is often included as dead biomass.‖ Third Assessment, supra note 33. 
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the atmosphere.
73
 Given the severity of climate change and the potential of carbon sinks to 
sequester carbon which would otherwise be located in the atmosphere, it is evident why an 
interest has been taken in using carbon sequestration as an interim strategy for climate change.  
 By and large, it will be the land management decisions of the 240,000 Canadian 
agricultural producers, as well as the land management decisions of numerous other public and 
private land managers, which will dictate Canada‘s ability to use biotic carbon sequestration to 
mitigate the effects of atmospheric carbon dioxide.
74
 Thus, legislators are creating and / or 
allowing private property in carbon assets for use in offset markets to provide an incentive for 
individual land managers to engage in carbon sequestration practices and projects, even though 
this creation of private property in a natural cycle is contrary to the legal principles espoused by 
Locke and Wilberforce. 
 But there may be private property rights in rain, once collected, rain being part of the 
water cycle.
75
 A person who puts out a barrel and collects rain as it falls is likely to have private 
property rights in the rain water collected, unless otherwise reserved for the government or the 
commons by the laws of the nation. Why, then, is it not also legitimate for persons to have 
property rights in the carbon assets they collect?  
 The short answer to this question is that property exists in the rainwater, not in the 
component elements – hydrogen and oxygen. Persons, similarly, already have property rights to 
the res
76
 in which the carbon is located; if an individual grows a tree, she has property rights in 
that tree. Both the collected rainwater and the tree are the products of nature, which Locke 
recognizes as being capable of garnering property rights
77
 and the rights to which Wilberforce 
would classify as being definable, identifiable, assumable, and stable, and not merely 
components of a natural cycle. The cycle itself, as further explored by Gray,
78
 cannot be owned; 
collecting rain does not give the collector any rights to precipitation generally nor to the 
hydrogen in the barrel as a separate and distinct property right from the water. Nor should 
sequestering carbon give the land manager any property rights in the sequestration process or the 
carbon in the sink as a separate and distinct property right from the vegetation or biomass. The 
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 Stern, supra note 20 at 537. 
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 Canada: Working Group on Offsets, Offset System Discussion Paper (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 2003) at 41.  
75
 Kwasniak, supra note 60. 
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 Gray, supra note 58. 
18 
 
value of the collected barrel of rain is in the water, not in artificially altering the water cycle and 
not in its component elements. The collector wants the rain, not to alter the water cycle. The 
sequesterer of carbon, on the other hand, if property rights are granted, is primarily interested in 
altering the carbon cycle, rather than possessing the carbon.  
 The collected water property rights example can be further distinguished from property 
rights in the carbon cycle. First, the property owner of the water intends to exercise control over 
the water and derive individual benefit from this control. In contradiction, a land manager is not 
able to accurately measure and exercise significant control over the carbon stored in sinks on her 
land. For example, a land manager cannot control the carbon dioxide released from carbon sinks 
through plant respiration and plant decomposition. Further, in water, the collected water, by the 
collector‘s design, provides no benefits to anyone other than the collector, whereas in carbon 
assets, the sequestration of carbon is intended to provide a secondary, arguably greater, benefit to 
society than to the monetarily compensated individual sequesterer by reducing atmospheric 
carbon dioxide.  
 How would the above analysis be altered if the water was collected in a reservoir behind 
a dam, rather than in a rain barrel? Would the collector still possess private property rights to the 
collected water? Some collected water can provide broader, public benefits—as in reservoirs 
created behind dammed rivers; but in these cases, the rivers, dams, and reservoirs are not 
privately owned. Following Gray‘s analysis, and with reference to riparian property rights, this 
water is not privately owned because it is not reasonable to exclude others from its benefits. The 
owner of the dam and/or those who have otherwise acquired riparian rights may have a right to 
use the water, but no ―fee simple‖ type ownership of the water itself.79  
 
2.1.3 Gray 
Gray sees a common feature of those resources which do not constitute property as being 
the inability to physically, legally, or morally exclude others from the resource.
80
 Failure to 
achieve any one of these requirements makes propertization unfeasible. 
When resources are physically available for use and exploitation by all, they remain 
unpropertized.
81
 Gray finds that for physical excludability to be present, it must be ―feasible for a 
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legal person to exercise regulatory control over the access of strangers to the various benefits 
inherent in the resource.‖82 A light thrown out by a lighthouse, for example, is not property as, 
once the light is on, no person is able to control access to the benefits of the light.
83
 While there 
is property in the lighthouse and the light-switch, so that a stranger may be prevented from 
entering the lighthouse to control the operation of the light, there is no property in the beam of 
light as the benefits of the light are distributed indiscriminately. The ability of the lighthouse 
owner to manipulate the direction and intensity of the light beam does not sufficiently physically 
exclude others‘ access to the beam to justify the creation of property in the beam.84  
Similarly, it is not possible to physically exclude others from the environmental benefits 
derived from carbon sequestration and the retention of carbon sinks. Pursuant to Gray: ―[n]o one 
can claim ‗property‘ in a resource in relation to which it is physically unrealistic to control, 
consistently over prolonged periods, the access of strangers.‖85 In this way, the benefits of 
carbon assets can be analogized to Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co. Ltd. v. 
Taylor.
86
 Although Victoria Park Racing had benefits stemming from its property rights in the 
racetrack, it did not have property in the spectacle of horseracing as any attempt to exclude 
strangers from the spectacle of horseracing could be frustrated by potential spectators increasing 
the height of any broadcasting tower.
87
  
Individuals need not take any active measures to enjoy the benefits achieved from the 
sequestration of atmospheric carbon. The reduction of the concentration of atmospheric carbon 
prevents the global temperature from rising as quickly as it otherwise would, thereby mitigating 
the potentially devastating effects of climate change. Thus, pursuant to Gray‘s theory of physical 
excludability, the physical paper on which the offset credit is recorded may be physically 
excludable as the piece of paper can be protected from strangers. However, exclusion from the 
paper record of the credit is not the same as the exclusion from the asset or its real, 
environmental benefits.
88
 The real benefits of carbon sequestration potential, carbon sinks, and 
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sequestered carbon are not capable of being excludable, thus these assets are rightly non-
property.  
In law, excludability occurs when a resource is protectable against strangers by legal 
means.
89
 Legal ability to exclude is not as simple to determine as physical ability to exclude. 
Gray, for example, states that where one fails to use a means to legally exclude strangers from 
the benefits of a resource, and those strangers succeed in gaining access to the benefits of the 
resource, he has failed to stake out his claim to the resource.
90
 An argument can be made that 
property rights in carbon assets are not legally excludable because legislators are unable to 
prevent the human population from ―trespassing‖ on these property rights by enjoying the 
benefits of this resource. As seen by the lighthouse beam, the law cannot provide a means to 
deny others the benefits of the light beam. This is opposed to property rights in a public mall as 
the owner of the mall is able to dictate when shoppers may or may not use the premises. Like the 
lighthouse beam and unlike mall, legal control is not available to a carbon asset rights holder. 
Similarly, as land use and land-use change is a net sink,
91
 biological sequestration above 
equilibrium reduces the concentration of atmospheric carbon, thereby lessening the urgency of 
the implementation of emission regulations. Thus, emitters not already subject to emissions 
regulation have and are gaining access to the benefits of carbon sequestered in carbon sinks, 
while those emitters who are subject to regulation benefit from less stringent regulation than 
otherwise required. It can be argued that emitters are thus ―trespassing‖ on the benefits attained 
from sequestered carbon.  
As seen in chapter 1, legislators are attempting to assign carbon rights
92
 into traditional 
categories of property, such as incorporeal real interests or choses in possession, categories 
which, in other cases of private property, signify the existence of legal exclusion. But, defining a 
resource as being legally excludable and the resource actually being legally excludible are two 
different things. The question is whether property rights can be assigned biotic sequestration 
portion of the carbon cycle in a way which creates legal excludability for the rights holder. It is 
not possible to legally exclude a natural cycle, its constant fluctuations being spontaneous, 
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global, and uncontrollable, and the cycle itself not capable of possession. Thus, it is unlikely that 
property rights can be structured in a way that prevents strangers from gaining access to the 
benefits of the resource. Centuries of the absence of any such property right prior to the advent of 
carbon assets lends support to this conclusion.  
Even though the carbon cycle is not physically or legally excludable, it is relevant to 
examine whether the cycle is morally excludable. Morally, ―there are certain resources which are 
simply perceived to be so central or intrinsic to constructive human coexistence that it would be 
severely anti-social that these resources should be removed from the commons.‖93 Where 
―intolerable consequences‖ would result from one person controlling access to the benefits of a 
resource, this resource is best held as non-property. For example, Rose argues that some 
resources should be non-property for public benefit.
94
 Hepburn notes that there are already 
concerns about the commoditization of the atmosphere; should carbon trading expand, these 
concerns will become more intense.
95
 To provide an example supporting Hepburn‘s fear of the 
consequences of environmental commoditization, everyone needs to breath oxygen to survive; 
taking the assignment of property rights to the atmosphere to a logical extreme, assigning private 
property rights to oxygen in the oxygen cycle and creating oxygen markets to promote cost-
effective uses of oxygen would be detrimental to every individual and to society.  
Another moral excludability argument against creating private property in carbon assets 
is that each land manager‘s choices relating to carbon sinks will affect the environment, and 
possibly the health of all Canadians. If the rights, interests, and obligation of individual land 
managers and the public do not align, non-property makes it easier for governments to make 
decisions on how to best balance the resultant conflicts with regard to human dependence on the 
carbon cycle and a sustainable atmosphere for life. 
Apart from the moral inability to exclude individuals from the carbon cycle, it is also 
morally improper to attempt to exclude when private property rights are being created in the 
carbon cycle without any real expectation that these rights will continue, or continue to have 
value. For example, since value in carbon assets depends on governments creating emission 
standards, which emitters could meet through the purchase of carbon assets, success of the 
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policy, resulting in governments eliminating tradable carbon offset, may be seen as an 
expropriation of property rights in carbon assets, specifically carbon sinks and carbon 
sequestration potential.
96
 Success of carbon policies will be achieved when emitters meet 
standards without the use of offsets, thus property rights in carbon assets becoming irrelevant. 
The government could also abandon the use of the sinks-based offsets in the market, also 
diminishing the value of carbon property. Further, by creating property in a natural cycle, 
subsequently enacting environmental regulations for the benefit of all in a way which offends 
private property rights previously allocated in the natural cycle could constitute a trespass or 
taking of property;
97
 theorists have already begun to examine ―whether the imposition of 
extensive environmental regulations can ever constitute an acquisition or taking of ‗property‘ 
from the citizens which requires the payment of publically-funded compensation.‖98 Morally, the 
carbon cycle is not excludable because society should be able to alter its carbon policy and 
regulate in relation to environmental well-being without being compelled to compensate persons 
for a loss of property rights.  
According to Gray‘s theory of excludability, physical, legal, and moral excludability 
must be present for property to exist in a resource. Since carbon assets, as opposed to the 
physical assets of which carbon is a key component, are not physically, legally, or morally 
excludable, the portion of the carbon cycle represented by carbon sequestration potential, carbon 
sinks, sequestered carbon, and carbon offsets is not the legitimate subject of property.  
Gray‘s theory does not, however, prevent the creation of property in offsets which are not 
sinks-based. For example, pursuant to Gray‘s theory, it was reasonable and legitimate for the 
United States to create property rights in government generated acid rain credits operating in a 
market in the Acid Rain Program.
99
 The Acid Rain Program‘s creation of allowance credits is 
very distinct from the current attempt to create property in the carbon cycle. Acid rain credits 
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were physically excludable as they were government allowances not connected to the physical 
existence of sulphur or nitrogen, they were legally excludable as strangers were unable to benefit 
from the use of the credits, and they were morally excludable as they did not create property in a 
natural cycle. The Acid Rail Program did not create property rights in sulfur dioxide or nitrogen 
oxides; property rights were created in an allowance to pollute.  
 
2.2  Further Analysis Required 
 Although the works of Locke, Wilberforce, and Gray lead to the conclusion that property 
rights are not able exist in the carbon cycle, significant societal changes since the above theories 
were advanced requires that this thesis re-examines whether property rights can and should exist 
in natural cycles. Global warming is an environmental condition unlike no other the world has 
ever seen, caused by humans managing and altering the natural carbon cycle. Further, creative 
policies are required to mitigate the effects of global warming. As such, this thesis points to 
humans actively managing the carbon cycle, the desire to manipulate the carbon cycle, and the 
current existence of private property rights in carbon assets as reasons for this thesis to further 
explore whether private property rights in carbon assets can be justified.  
 
2.2.1 Managing the Cycle 
The appropriateness of private property rights in carbon assets requires further 
exploration as, to some extent, humans are actively managing the carbon cycle. For example, 
because of the unnatural release of carbon into the atmosphere from the lithosphere through the 
use of fossil fuels and because humans are widely disbursed throughout nature and dictate the 
use of a large portion of the world‘s land surface, including whether sequestration activities 
occur, it is without question that human activities have interfered with the natural balance of the 
carbon cycle. The carbon cycle is no longer exclusively the ―spontaneous hand of nature‖;100 
carbon sinks are created and destroyed through human choice, preventing the cycle from existing 
as it would apart from human intervention. Given the management of the carbon cycle and the 
evolution of science and technology allowing the cycle to be controlled, it may be argued that a 
natural carbon cycle no longer exists.  
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2.2.2 Desire to Manipulate the Carbon Cycle 
Excess atmospheric carbon dioxide is connected to climate change, the consequences of 
which are undesirable.
101
 The accepted solution for rebalancing the carbon cycle, from a 
scientific perspective, is to reduce and reverse the trend of carbon exiting the lithosphere and 
entering the atmosphere – i.e. reducing existing carbon emissions and promoting and protecting 
carbon sinks. In the purported implementation of this solution, legislators and policy analysts 
have, contrary to Locke, Wilberforce, and Gray, accepted private property in a portion of the 
carbon cycle for use in offset markets.  
Legislators are relying on the economic theory ideal that, by creating private property 
rights in carbon assets the market should, hypothetically, allow emitters creativity in meeting 
emission targets and create an economic value for, and thus an incentives for land managers to 
engage in, sequestration activities, consequently manipulating the carbon cycle. For example, a 
coal burning factory which emits one tonne of carbon dioxide, but pays a farmer to convert two 
acres of his farmland to no-till seeding, offsets its emissions and encourages the land manger to 
undertake carbon sequestration activities.
102
 Theoretically, this relationship should result in a net 
zero increase of atmospheric carbon dioxide, whereas a net increase of carbon dioxide would 
have occurred without the offset.
103
  
Economic theorists contend that humans are motivated by self interest.
104
 Using the 
assumption that a person is a rational maximizer of his or her satisfaction and economic well-
being, economic analysis proposes that wealth maximization in a society will occur if preference 
is given to the individual who is willing to pay the most for a preference. This theory suggests 
that ―once property rights are established, a free and notionally costless series of transactions will 
inevitably produce maximum efficiency.‖105  
There is a limited amount of money available for carbon emissions reduction and climate 
change mitigation. This money should be put to its best use to maximize environmental and 
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economic returns. The economic theory argument is that actors in the market are in the best 
position to decide how to maximize their personal economic returns – whether it is through 
creating carbon property, reducing emissions by discontinuing production or adopting lower-
emissions technology, or purchasing offsets. 
Yet, the original proponents of cap-and-trade markets being used to combat other environmental 
issues are very much opposed to the use of cap-and-trade to regulate carbon.
106
 They argue that 
the carbon issue is too large and complex for the carbon market and that markets do not allow the 
flexibility needed to ensure emission limits correspond to scientific knowledge and discoveries 
on climate change.
107
 Further, society is not attempting to ―maximize personal economic returns‖ 
through the creation of property rights in carbon, we are interested in achieving the greatest 
environmental success from the lowest resource expenditure. Nevertheless, legislators continue 
to support carbon markets as they are presented as a relatively simple, resource-moderate 
solution to climate change.
108
  
 
2.2.3 Private Property Rights have been Created 
 Property rights currently exist in carbon assets in formal law. Canada, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec have all created or have shown 
interest in creating private property rights in carbon assets.
109
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a. Canada 
Canada has not created property rights in carbon assets. Canada has, however, thoroughly 
examined the creation of property rights in carbon assets and domestic emissions trading, 
beginning with the historic Climate Change Plan for Canada
110
 (―Climate Change Plan‖), 
released by the then Liberal Government in 2002, that proposed a dual common property and 
private property regime for carbon offsets, and possibly sequestered carbon.
111
 The most recent 
communication from the Government of Canada regarding its position on property rights in 
carbon is seen in 2008‘s Turning the Corner: An Action Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and 
Air Pollution
112
 and related document Turning the Corner: Canada’s Offset System for 
Greenhouse Gases (collectively ―Turning the Corner‖).113  
Turning the Corner proposes a voluntary off-set program designed and operated by the 
federal government. The purpose of the Offset System is to ―encourage cost-effective domestic 
reductions or removals in activities that are not expected to be covered by proposed industrial air 
emissions regulations. Projects, such as afforestation/reforestation and soil management projects, 
that meet the eligibility criteria can generate offset credits that can be sold in the market.‖114 
Turning the Corner suggests that sequesterors have private property rights in the carbon they 
sequester in biological sinks, as represented by an offset credit, provided they voluntarily register 
their offset activities.
115
 No voluntary offset program has been, to date, created by the federal 
government.   
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b. Alberta 
 Section 9 of Alberta‘s Climate Change and Emissions Management Act states that: ―a 
sink right is a property right‖. 116 Subsection 1(f) defines ―sink right‖ as ―the legal interest, and 
any commercial or other interest, in a sink‖.117 The Act, however, does not define the nature of 
the property right or the benefits and obligations associated with that right.  
In 2007, the Climate Change and Emissions Management Act
118
 was amended to create 
North America‘s first compliance offset carbon market.119 Producers with an emission intensity 
of more than 100 kt Equivalent Carbon Dioxide (―CO2e‖) per year are required to reduce their 
emissions by 12 percent from their baseline.
120
 Emitters unable to meet their reduction target are 
given the option of obtaining Emission Performance Credits from other regulated producers that 
reduced their emissions more than required, purchasing Technology Fund Credits by paying into 
the Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund $15/tonne CO2e, or purchasing Emission 
Offsets from approved offset projects.
121
 Offset projects do not have to be located in Alberta. For 
example, the ―Quantification Protocol for Tillage System Management‖ allows any annual crop 
grown throughout Canada to be eligible for approval.
122
 Alberta‘s intention in the Climate 
Change and Emissions Management Act appears to be the use of carbon property rights in offset 
markets as well as the protection of private individual‘s property rights in carbon sinks. 
 
c. Saskatchewan 
 Like Alberta, Saskatchewan is interested in creating private property rights in carbon 
assets both to acknowledge that carbon rights can be held by private persons and for use of 
property rights in an offset market. Saskatchewan‘s Energy and Climate Change Plan noted 
―several thousand Saskatchewan Farmers are selling credits for sequestered carbon dioxide that 
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are traded on an American exchange‖ and the Plan ―assumes an emissions credit trading system 
will be established in Canada‖.123 Further, through The Management and Reduction of 
Greenhouse Gases Act,
124
 Saskatchewan appears to be pursuing mandatory GHG reductions and 
an offset system. This Act defines ―offset credit‖ as ―…a credit for any prescribed activity 
that…sequesters greenhouse gas‖. As of March 9, 2012, The Management and Reduction of 
Greenhouse Gases Act had not been proclaimed.
125
  
 
d. Manitoba 
 Manitoba has committed to the International Carbon Action Partnership [ICAP].
126
 ICAP 
is a partnership for regions interested in pursuing the development of a global carbon market 
through the implementation of mandatory cap and trade systems.
127
 Manitoba, however, has 
indicated that it has not yet decided whether private or common property exist in carbon 
assets.
128
  
 
e. British Columbia 
Through the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Act,
129
 British Columbia appears to have 
created private property in carbon. Subsection 12(g) of the Act gives the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council the ability to make regulations concerning emissions offsets, including which projects or 
actions constitute offsets. Section 1 of the accompanying Regulations states: ―Ownership, in 
relation to a greenhouse gas reduction, includes an established right to claim legal or commercial 
benefits arising from the achievement of the reduction.‖ Section 3 defined the Regulations as 
being applicable to ―controlled sources, sinks or reservoirs in British Columbia.‖  
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 Although British Columbia is part of ICAP, which suggests this province is interested in 
a global carbon market, British Columbia‘s carbon strategy in the last couple of years seems 
focused on taxation, such as amending the Motor Fuel Tax Act and creating a carbon tax with the 
Carbon Tax Act.
130
 The failure of this government to follow through with the creation of a 
carbon market may reflect a recognition that the carbon market will not achieve the Province‘s 
current goals.  
 
f. Ontario 
In both Go Green: Ontario’s Action Plan on Climate Change131 and Climate Change 
Action Plan: Creating our Sustainable Future,
132
 Ontario shows its intention to create private 
property rights in carbon assets to support emissions trading in that province. In 2009, in further 
support of the creation of private property rights in carbon assets in Ontario, the Environmental 
Protection Amendment Act (Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading) was passed.
133
  
 
g. Quebec 
In June 2009, Quebec passed Bill 42, amending the Environment Quality Act and creating 
the framework for a cap and trade system.
134
 The sections dealing with a cap-and-trade system 
are not yet in force. However, Quebec‘s Environment Minister, Pierre Arcand, announced in 
December, 2011 that, as of January 1, 2013, companies which emit more than 25,000 tonnes of 
greenhouse gases annually will be regulated, with emissions standards to be met through a cap-
and-trade program.
135
 At this time, it does not appear that offsets can be created from biotic 
sequestration in the proposed cap-and-trade system and it is unlikely that Quebec will create 
property in carbon through its cap-and-trade program.  
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h. Individuals 
 Individuals are currently entering into contracts for the lease or sale of sequestered 
carbon.
136
 The sale or lease of carbon and / or carbon offsets are taking place without 
interference from any level of government. Because governments are not preventing private 
individuals from entering into contracts concerning sequestration activities on private land, it is 
assumed that governments, both provincial and federal, are consenting to some kind of private 
property rights existing in sequestered carbon. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
Locke‘s theory, that the ―spontaneous hand of nature‖ is properly non-property, can be 
seen in the past nonexistence of property rights in the carbon cycle (the ―hand of nature‖) and the 
recognition of property rights in a tree (the product of the natural cycle). Concluding the carbon 
cycle is properly non-property is further supported by the case law of Wilberforce. For a property 
right in carbon assets to be legally acceptable, that right must be ―definable, identifiable by third 
parties, capable of its nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence 
or stability‖.137 Because the carbon cycle lacks permanence, as well as the ability to be defined, 
identified, and assumed, the associated property rights will possess the same defects. 
While Wilberforce looks at the legitimacy of property rights, Gray examines the 
legitimacy of excluding a resource from the public domain. Applying Gray‘s analysis to the 
carbon cycle, it is evident that carbon assets are not the proper subject of property as the carbon 
cycle is not able to be physically, legally, or morally excluded. The environmental services 
provided by land managers, while valuable, do not constitute the creation of private property 
because of the physical, legal, and moral inability of the land manager to exclude others from 
accessing the benefits of the environmental services.   
 However, human interference with the carbon cycle prevents the carbon cycle from 
existing in its natural form. Legislators desire, through encouraging above business-as-usual 
carbon sequestration, to further alter the natural cycle in a premeditated way to achieve climate 
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change mitigation. Legislation has been created to this effect. Human interference with the 
carbon cycle and the use of private property rights in carbon policies requires that this thesis re-
examine the appropriateness of private property rights in the carbon cycle by exploring whether 
any of the common justification of private property are able to justify private property rights in 
carbon assets.  
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CHAPTER 3: PROPERTY THEORY IS UNABLE TO JUSTIFY 
PRIVATE PROPERTY IN CARBON ASSETS 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 In spite of the analysis in chapter 2, private property in carbon assets has been accepted 
by both legislators and reflected in carbon markets throughout the world. In light of the creation 
of private property rights in carbon assets, and because of human management of the carbon 
cycle, it is appropriate to reassess whether carbon assets as private property can be justified by 
any of the various theories that justify private property. This chapter will show that property 
theory is unable to justify private property in carbon assets. Chapter 4 will confirm that it is 
carbon property rights, rather than deficiencies of the market, that are causing carbon markets to 
fail.  
 To determine whether private property rights in carbon assets are appropriate, this 
chapter examines the various justifications of private property, being: utilitarian, personal self-
assertion, special rights, economic and rights-based theories. With reference to the characteristics 
of carbon assets and to the use of carbon assets in environmental markets, this chapter will only 
accept private property rights in carbon assets if these rights are justified pursuant to any one of 
the property theories identified above. This thesis uses a low threshold to justify private property 
in carbon assets by design.  
 
3.1 Utilitarian Theory 
Utilitarian property theorists justify private property when the total or average happiness 
of society is greater or the general welfare is better served under a private property regime than 
under some other property regime.
138
 Private property is justified in a resource when this form of 
property, as compared to other forms of property, maximizes society‘s preferences. Aristotle, for 
example, although in favour of communal use of resources,
139
 used utilitarian theory to justify 
private property since private property encourages care of resources: ―What is common to the 
greatest number gets the least amount of care. Men pay most attention to what is their own: they 
care less for what is common‖. 140 Pursuant to Aristotle‘s utilitarian argument, investment in 
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private carbon assets by property ―owners‖ should increase the welfare of the community as a 
whole since the carbon assets are put to their best use. Society would be best served by numerous 
land managers investing in carbon sinks as their investment should consequently rebalance the 
carbon cycle by storing carbon in biomass. Private property in carbon assts is justified pursuant 
to utilitarian theory when private property rights, rather than non-property, common, property, or 
collective property, best meets the goals of society.  
The utilitarian justification of property is not without criticism. This thesis observes 
utilitarian theory to be deficient for two main reasons. First, maximizing the happiness of a 
society as a whole can result in the intense suffering of a few—utilitarian theory does not 
consider values such as social justice and equity.
141
 Second, utilitarian theory takes the 
preferences of a population as a given and attempts to maximize the preference.
142
 Waldron uses 
the example of persecution in a society. If one group takes pleasure in persecuting another group, 
utilitarian theory may suggest social protection not be extended to the persecuted group.
143
 Also 
of note is the difficulty in choosing a society‘s favoured preference if popular preferences are in 
conflict—for example, it is difficult to choose between the environment, social relations, and 
economic well-being when they are competing values. 
This thesis rejects the use of utilitarian theory to justify private property in carbon assets 
as it is unable to advance a sustainable approach to environmental conservation. There is no 
sweeping, single solution to a complex problem such as climate change. Environmental 
conservation requires a community-focused approach which is tailored to respond to a 
community‘s unique issues, goals, and culturally acceptable rules. An example of the way in 
which the utilitarian justification of private property in carbon assets prevents a sustainable 
approach to environmental conservation is seen in the conversion of forest land to agriculture 
land in Africa. Economic theorists, such as Stern, argue that society must change the structure of 
economic incentives in relation to carbon in a way which protects existing forests and 
encourages afforestation and reforestation,
144
 and thereby incidentally reducing atmospheric 
carbon for the benefit of all. Private property in carbon assets, pursuant to Stern‘s model, would 
function in an international market so as to promote and finance widespread carbon sequestration 
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activities, including in economically poor regions in Africa.
145
 However, private property rights 
in carbon assets, with its ―one-size-fits-all‖ approach, can jeopardize a community‘s subsistence 
and threaten the security of other legal rights or social benefits.  
Africa is identified as an area which is vulnerable to deforestation.
146
 For the most part, 
the individuals responsible for the deforestation in Africa are small-scale subsistence farmers.
147
 
It is short-sighted to solely concentrate on how to create financial instruments which make the 
retention of forests more economically valuable than the cultivation of the land for agriculture. It 
is similarly detrimental to focus on protecting an individual carbon right holder‘s entitlement 
above all other considerations, including the production of food locally.  
To determine the best use of land in Africa, the debate should include an examination of 
the quantity and type of food required to sustain the community, whether current agricultural 
land is being used efficiently, ways in which biodiversity and water quality can be maintained or 
improved, and the role of forestry and agriculture in the community‘s culture and economy. 
Although the international carbon market may prefer the flexibility offsets provide to emitters in 
achieving emission targets by creating carbon property in Africa, managing conflict over land 
use and environmental conservation is about more than just property rights in carbon assets. As 
per Ostrom ―Policy analysts who would recommend a single prescription for commons problems 
have paid little attention to how diverse institutional arrangements operate in practice.‖148 A 
holistic, community approach must be taken to achieve environmental success. Based on 
utilitarian theory‘s inability to protect social rights, and its failure to understand the nuances of 
environmental issues, as well as the carbon market‘s preference to achieve economic goals over 
environmental goals, utilitarian theory must be rejected as a justification of private property 
rights in carbon assets because utilitarian theory is unable to demonstrate how private property in 
carbon assets better serves society than some other form of property.   
However, utilitarian theory is rarely presented as a standalone justification of private 
property. Little weight is given to the argument that ―society is best served by private property 
because it just is‖. Instead, the utilitarian justification is usually linked to other justifications of 
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private property; utilitarian arguments can be linked to a rights-based theory to show that private 
property increases individual rights, to a personality theory to show that private property 
increases human development, or to an economic theory to show private property increases 
wealth. This thesis now turns to these other justifications of private property to examine how 
they may justify private property in carbon assets.  
 
3.2 Personal Self Assertion 
Numerous theorists, such as Hegel, Ahrens, and Lorimer, propose that personal self-
assertion in the external world must occur for individuals to reach ―personhood‖, or a full and 
proper human life. This self-assertion occurs through individuals having rights in property.
149
 
Hegel, for example, concluded social institutions are shaped by property and property defines the 
way in which people fit into social institutions. Hegel justifies private property because every 
individual needs some control over resources in the external environment to participate in social 
institutions and reach personhood.
150
  
Hegel‘s personality theory states that private property is closely connected to the 
personality of an individual and that through an individual‘s property he develops reason, will, 
personality, and individuality.
151
 Since carbon, as opposed to land, is not viewed as being closely 
connected to one‘s sense of self, and property in carbon has not previously been held as private 
property, one can reasonably conclude that recognizing carbon as private property will not 
greatly influence an individual‘s ability to develop reason, will, personality, and individuality.  
Instead, property rights in carbon have the potential to disrupt self-assertion through 
complicating land tenure, changing established rights in real property, and dictating a land 
manager‘s use of her land.152 Land is thought of as being closely and strongly connected to 
personality. For example, numerous wars and other conflicts have been commenced to assert 
sovereignty over land. Ellickson writes ―[b]eyond dispute, botched land policies have been the 
chief domestic source of human woe during the past century.‖153 Pursuant to personal self-
assertion theories, private property in carbon should not be created since carbon rights have the 
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potential to interfere with the use and enjoyment of land, which is intimately connected to the 
personality of those with an interest therein.  
 
3.3 Economic Theory 
Economic theorists rarely attempt to justify private property.
154
 Instead, economic 
theorists generally begin with the presumptions that private property is beneficial and that all 
resources can be privately held.
155
 Posner, however, points to competition for scarce resources 
and encouraging investment when justifying private property:
156
 
What cannot be ignored is why property rights are granted—what social 
functions they serve. Two are paramount. First, without exclusive rights to the 
use of tracts of land or other valuable physical objects, these properties would 
be overused—if anyone has the right to graze his cattle on a pasture, the pasture 
will be overgrazed and hence depleted prematurely, because each cattle owner 
will tend to ignore the costs that the grazing by his cattle imposes on the other 
users of the pasture. Second, without exclusive rights, there will be insufficient 
incentives to invest in improving property: if you cannot be assured of being 
able to reap what you have sown, you won‘t sow, and the land will lie fallow. 
 
 Posner‘s first point is that property rights protect valuable resources from competitive use 
and overuse. Once a resource becomes valuable, laws and / or the market are needed to govern 
the management and use of the resource.
157
 Posner writes ―the moment [a resource] became 
scarce…it became the subject of property rights in law.‖158 Privatizing scarce resources is one 
way to avoid a tragedy of the commons.
159
  
Hardin creates a hypothetical common pasture to explain the tragedy of the commons.
160
 
All members of the community are entitled to graze their cattle on the pasture. As the cost of 
grazing livestock is externalized on the pasture and the benefits of selling livestock remains 
internalized, community members will increase the size of their herds to maximize individual 
profits. By not considering the health of the pasture when deciding the number of cattle to graze 
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and by attempting to maximize personal gains by grazing as many cattle as possible, self-
interested community members will deplete the common resource to the point of ruin.  
The current state of atmospheric carbon is analogous to Hardin‘s pasture: there is no 
incentive to invest, there is no incentive to postpone use, there is an exploitation way of thinking 
(in that emitters disregard the harms caused by their emissions), and emitters are able to 
externalize costs while internalizing gains. For example, there is no rational economic reason for 
an emitter to evolve from high emissions technology to low emissions technology if that low 
emissions technology is more costly. Thus, in order to end the tragedy of the commons for 
atmospheric carbon dioxide, Hardin would suggest that either privatization of carbon emissions 
or the creation of regulations to govern the use of the atmosphere must occur.
161
  
However, while atmospheric carbon may be ―tragic‖, there is evidence that Hardin‘s 
tragedy of the commons is not present in biotic carbon sinks in Canada, particularly in relation to 
agricultural lands. Carbon stored in agricultural sinks is not in jeopardy because it is recognized 
as a type of property other than private property. In 2008, agricultural soils, managed forests, 
managed wetlands, and land-use change were a net sink of 13Mt CO2e.
162
 Although 13Mt CO2e 
sequestered through land use and land-use change does little to offset the 734 Mt CO2e emitted 
in Canada in 2008, land use and land-use change is part of the solution to climate change, not the 
problem.   
A Parliamentary Research Branch report for the Government of Canada entitled ―Carbon 
Sequestration by Agricultural Soil‖ held that carbon captured by plants and the carbon returned 
to the atmosphere from the soils was balanced in 2001:
163
 ―emissions from agricultural soils 
decreased from 7.7 million tonnes in 1981 to 1.8 million tonnes in 1996; they are believed to be 
virtually zero today.‖164 In 2008, croplands were a net sink of 4.4 Mt CO2e, a figure which 
includes the impact of converting forest and grassland to cropland.
165
 The reason cultivated soils 
behave like carbon sinks is because of the adoption of no-till and reduced tillage practices and 
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the reduction of the use of summer fallow, both of which promote carbon sequestration in soil 
biomass.
166
  
Carbon sinks on agricultural land are not tragic as they are indirectly protected through 
best land management practices, practices which increase a land manager‘s economic returns by 
increasing soil health and increasing crop yield. If carbon sinks on agricultural land are not 
tragic, there is no reason to create private property in carbon assets associated with agricultural 
land to avoid Hardin‘s tragedy of the commons. Creating property in carbon to prevent tragedy 
of the commons on agricultural land is an unnecessary creation of property that will serve no 
benefit in this instance.  
Moreover, carbon is not scarce.
167
 There are billions of tons of carbon sequestered in 
terrestrial plants and soil organic matter.
168
 There is also the potential to sequester billions of 
additional metric tonnes in soil organic matter or terrestrial plants. Thus, as seen by the failure of 
the Chicago Climate Exchange,
 169
 artificial scarcity, such as that derived from state regulation, 
must be created for private property in carbon assets associated with agricultural land or any 
other biotic sink to exist.  
 The Chicago Climate Exchange (―CCX‖) was a voluntary, legally-binding greenhouse 
gas trading system operating in North America and Brazil which traded greenhouse gas 
allowances from 2003-2010.
170
 The Exchange ended in 2010 because of lack of legislative 
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interest in the United States.
171
 In April, 2010, Intercontinental Exchange Inc. (―ICE‖) purchased 
CCX. ICE reportedly planned to lay off approximately half of the CCX staff, citing lack of U.S. 
action on climate change.
172
 In August, 2011, ICE announced it would close its U.S. emissions 
derivatives platform after the first quarter of 2012.
173
 Low exchange volumes and the Exchange 
operating at a loss were the reasons given by ICE for the closure.
174
 Without governments 
creating artificial scarcity, there is no interest in the purchase of greenhouse gas allowances. 
Ultimately, because there was no demand for allowances, the value of the carbon exchanges was 
not sufficiently high to cover the administrative costs incurred by the CCX, resulting in the 
closure.  
When private property possesses no economic value, Posner‘s first point is irrelevant – 
there is no competition to use the resource. The abundance of supply of carbon offsets and the 
lack of demand for offsets led to the closure of the CCX market, resulting in carbon credits in 
North America being economically valueless (unless the carbon credits possessed value under 
another program, such as Alberta‘s Emissions Regulation and Offset System). In the case of the 
CCX, the free market corrected the inappropriate awarding of private property rights carbon 
assets and continued as if no property rights existed in the resource.  
Posner‘s second point, that property is justified as it encourages investment, provides that 
an individual will be more likely to invest in property when he receives a return upon his 
investment. This is a valid point; an individual is less likely to engage in a carbon sequestration 
project if he does not know whether he will economically benefit from his investment. However, 
as seen from the discussion above, the question remains: from where are the returns which are to 
encourage investment derived? Further, are private property rights used in carbon markets 
encouraging environmentally beneficial investment? Economic theory advances that property 
rights derive economic benefits from market transactions. However, by creating market value in 
carbon offsets, as will be shown below and in section 4.3, the economic theory justification in 
private property is forcing society to choose between economic success and environmental 
success.  
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Although using offsets from biotic sequestration activities as part of the market approach 
increases the flexibility of market players and rewards investors for engaging in sequestration 
activities, offsets not only decrease the chance of a market-based approach being 
environmentally successful, but may cause environmental harm. Definitions of ―offsets‖ 
foreshadow the inability of offsets to achieve environmental benefits. The World Bank describes 
offsets as: ―Offsets designate the emission reductions from project-based activities that can be 
used to meet compliance—or corporate citizenship—objectives vis-à-vis greenhouse gas 
mitigation.‖175 In State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2011, the World Bank‘s opinion was 
that ―the CDM176 is simply not designed to drive the structural transformation of industry in 
developing countries that the transition to a low-carbon economy requires. By definition, offset 
mechanisms such as the CDM cannot reduce global emissions in net terms…‖.177 
Welch takes a more critical approach and defines offsets as an ―imaginary commodity 
created by deducting what you hope happens from what you guess would have happened.‖178 
According to Welch, this means that emissions reductions in one location can be avoided ―with a 
set of stories about what would have happened in an imagined future elsewhere‖.179 Thus, it has 
been argued that offsets, as allowed by the United Nations Clean Development Mechanism, are 
environmentally undesirable as they are being used to avoid emission reductions.
180
 Emitters can 
purchase property rights in carbon assets created by others who have sequestered carbon or 
reduced emissions, decreasing the urgency of emitters to adopt technological changes that would 
reduce carbon emissions.  
 Instead of achieving environmental success, in an offset trading market ―the net result 
tends to be an increase in greenhouse gas emissions.‖181 Three reasons can be offered to explain 
this result. First, there is the potential for offsets to overestimate the environmental benefits of 
carbon sequestration or emissions reductions projects. For example, there are numerous issues 
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with accurately measuring and verifying carbon sequestration and emissions,
182
 leading to the 
over-estimation of the amount of carbon sequestered, thus property created.  
 Second, insect infestation, forest fires, and any other destruction of the sink will negate 
any carbon ―savings‖ from revegetation. Carbon assets appear to be misleading as they can be 
twice destroyed – once through the sale to and use of the carbon right by a purchaser for the right 
to emit, i.e. the consumption of the offset benefit, and a second time by the actual destruction of 
the sink.
183
 To put it another way, it is as if a baker (land manager) is selling his property right in 
a loaf of bread (carbon sink or sequestration activity) to a consumer (emitter). The consumer may 
eat the bread (emit emissions), but the baker still has the loaf which he can destroy. The bread is 
thus a tangible chose in possession with a second artificial existence as a chose in action! The 
emitter is not motivated to reduce its emissions, but rather to purchase an artificially-created 
property interest so as to ―justify‖ its current and future emissions. Thus, contrary to the goals of 
environmental policies on carbon sequestration, a potential net increase in atmospheric carbon 
will result from emissions ―offset‖ by offset projects when the project is destroyed, whether the 
project is destroyed through human choice or natural causes.  
Third, offsets may reward sequestration efforts which would have occurred even without 
offsets being available. Market mechanisms cannot distinguish between environmental practices 
and carbon sinks that need promotion or protection and those which do not.
 184
 As will be shown 
in the theory of labour section, offsets are thus allowing emissions above regulations while 
rewarding project proponents for engaging in business-as-usual activities to ―offset‖ the excess 
emissions.  
Because scarcity does not exist in carbon assets to encourage competition for control or 
possession of carbon assets or carbon property rights, because there is no innate value in carbon 
assets in the free market (and the creation of artificial value is environmentally detrimental), and 
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because offsets are resulting in environmental damage rather than environmental investment, 
Posner‘s economic theory is not a justification of private property in carbon assets.   
 
3.4 Positivism/Special Rights 
Special right arguments,
185
 such as those advanced by Nozick, hold that specified 
individuals should have particular entitlement to certain resources based on historical 
entitlement.
186
 For example, opposition to health care reform in the United States may be based 
on the argument that health care should continue to remain private because individuals currently 
have private property rights, such as private property rights in hospitals. Special rights arguments 
would advocate for these private property rights not being confiscated or interfered with through 
the rights becoming collective property or by creating new collective property rights in direct 
competition to the private property rights.  
Nozick‘s special rights theory does not justify private property, but justifies maintaining 
whatever property rights in carbon which may have already existed.
187
 Until approximately 10 
years ago, prior to the carbon market‘s interest in carbon assets, biological carbon assets were 
either considered common property or non-property. Thus, based on historical entitlement, 
special rights theories would either justify common property or non-property in carbon assets.  
 
 
3.5 Rights-Based Theories 
Rights-based theories, or the theories of natural law, labour, possession, and occupation, 
justify private property when private property protects an individual‘s rights and entitlements. 
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3.5.1 Natural Law 
Unlike positive law, which is man-made and only enforceable in the enacting jurisdiction, 
natural rights-based theorists argue that property is a natural right,
188
 set by nature and 
recognized as valid by moral and rational people everywhere.
189
 Waldron also proposes private 
property rights may be natural because property rights are connected to the nature of human 
beings; humans are entitled to private property rights simply by virtue of their existence.
190
  
Locke presents two natural-right theories which are relevant to the justification of private 
property. Locke‘s first natural-rights theory is that Man has a natural right to his preservation. 
Private property rights protect an individual‘s right to survival as private property rights ensure 
security. For example, without private property rights in the food in one‘s pantry, one could not 
be sure that he will have food to eat for supper. Private property rights allow an individual to say 
―this is my bagel, and you may not eat it‖. Locke‘s second natural-rights theory, discussed in 
more detail in the labour section below, is that Man has a right to his labour.
191
  
Examining Locke‘s first natural-rights theory, that Man has a natural right to his 
preservation, private property rights in carbon are unlikely to, on their own, ensure an 
individual‘s preservation. As shown in the next paragraph, it is improbable that a forest land 
manager will be able to survive on the proceeds he receives from the sale of property rights in 
the carbon assets he creates; he will have to supplement his income through the sale of timber or 
other goods and services.  
The disconnect between private property rights in carbon assets and human preservation 
is demonstrated by one of the early criticisms of Alberta‘s Emissions Regulation and Offset 
System.  Because of the low price of carbon assets and the inability of agricultural soils to 
sequester large amounts of carbon, agricultural producers have little incentive to report their 
carbon activities for program approval.
192
 Thus, agricultural producers are simply not bothering 
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to apply for approval for their carbon sequestration projects. If recognition of private property 
rights in carbon assets is connected to the preservation of agricultural producers, participation in 
the System should be maximized. Alberta producers show that it is not. 
Natural law arguments can, alternatively, make an argument that carbon should be 
something other than private property as the creation of private property rights in carbon may 
restrict a land manager‘s use of his land. For example, a land manager may be prevented from 
breaking soil in pursuit of a livelihood or in pursuit of food production if she interferes with 
another‘s property interests, such as through incidentally releasing carbon sequestered pursuant 
to a conservation easement granted in the same land. Also, the creation of private property rights 
in offsets, which provide emitters the right to release carbon, may interfere with the natural right 
of all individuals to have an atmosphere and environment capable of sustaining human life.  
 
3.5.2 Possession at Common Law and First Occupancy 
The common law doctrine of possession is often used interchangeably with the academic 
property theory of first occupancy.
193
 As such, I set out the distinction between the two concepts, 
but analyze whether the theories collectively are able to justify private property rights in carbon 
assets.  
First occupancy holds that the first in time to occupy a res is the first in right.
194
 The 
doctrine of possession accepts that property rights are acquired through physical control over a 
res
195
 and an intention to control the res.
196
 The doctrine of possession and first occupancy are 
primarily theories of allocation which cannot, on their own, justify property.
197
 However, when 
the doctrine of possession and first occupancy are connected to labour theory, personality theory, 
expectation, or societal recognition, the theories may be a justification of property. 
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Labour: The common law doctrine of possession originally focused on wild animal cases, 
such as Pierson v. Post,
198
 but has been analogized to other areas of property law, such as oil and 
gas, ground water, and space on the spectrum of radio frequencies.
199
 Pursuant to the doctrine of 
possession and to the theory of labour, a possessor of a fugitive resource is rewarded with 
ownership of the resource because he is able capture and to put the resource to good use. 
Theoretically, resources under human control will be put to better use than if the resource is left 
in the wild. It can be reasonably argued that a land manager who is able to sequester carbon that 
would otherwise remain in the atmosphere should be granted property rights to that carbon 
pursuant to the doctrine of possession. Although this doctrine favors property in sequestered 
carbon it is dependant upon a specific intent to sequester carbon. Therefore, incidentally 
sequestered carbon would not be assigned property rights. Justifying private property in carbon 
assets based on the theory of labour will be further explored in section 3.5.3. 
Personality Theory: Hegel‘s personality theory states that private property is closely 
aligned to the personality of an individual and that it is through an individual‘s property that he 
develops reason, will, personality, and individuality.
200
 Hegel argues that an individual must put 
his will into a resource to make it his property. The first individual who inserts his will into a 
resource will be granted the initial allocation of this resource.
201
 Allowing a second individual to 
take possession of something already claimed causes great confusion and prevents man from 
living a full life of reason.
202
 However, carbon sinks have been possessed and abandoned by the 
sale of land or vegetation by land managers many times in the past without the loss of possessory 
rights to carbon negatively affecting the personality of the land manager. Thus, possession based 
on personality theory cannot justify private property in carbon assets.  
Expectation: Hume and Bentham argue that a resource should be allocated to the first 
person who takes possession of or occupies the resource because the possessing individual has 
the natural expectation that he will be able to possess, use, and enjoy the resource in his 
possession.
203
 Ryan comments on first possessors being justified in their takings by stating: ―the 
question we ask is negative, not positive, namely whether the thing is already occupied by a will 
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which demands greater respect.‖204 But, having an expectation of property rights is not a 
justification of property rights in that resource. An individual who steals a vehicle would, for 
example, be incorrect in believing she has any property rights in that vehicle.
205
 In any event, 
given the historic treatment of carbon in the past as common property or non-property, and the 
ambiguity surrounding the current state of property rights in carbon assets, persons who possess 
carbon would seem unlikely to have a legitimate expectation of property rights.  
Societal Recognition: The doctrine of possession depends on societal recognition of an 
individual‘s property rights. Possession at common law for Rose ―seems to amount to something 
like yelling loudly enough to all who may be interested. The first to say, ‗This is mine,‘ in a way 
that the public understands, gets the prize, and the law will help him keep it against someone else 
who says, ‗no, it is mine‘.‖206 Therefore, it is society‘s recognition of a property right in carbon 
assets that makes the property right just, rather than the possession itself. Thus possession in 
carbon assets (which the next paragraphs shows is not possible to achieve) in combination with 
societal recognition could justify private property rights in carbon assets.  
However, application of the Pierson v. Post test, which determines when resources are 
considered to be ―possessed‖, shows possession is not capable of justifying property in carbon. 
Pierson v. Post identified two reasons why possession should be recognized as the origin of 
property: 1) possession can only occur when notice is given to the world through a clear act, and 
thus consent of society is demanded and conceded; and, 2) possession can only occur when one 
―mixes in his labour‖, and thus possession rewards useful labour.207 In relation to the first prong 
of the justification, Kennett et al. point out there are an overwhelming number of scientific, 
technical, economic, legal and institutional challenges related to carbon which prevents notice 
being given through a clear act.
208
 For example, it is not possible to precisely measure how much 
carbon a land manager sequesters and releases from a carbon sink over a certain time period. In 
relation to the second prong of the test, a portion of carbon sinks may be created through the 
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labour of previous land managers or created naturally, thus without the labour of the possessing 
land manager. Further, as examined below, even when labour is present, the creation of private 
property rights must be balanced against other considerations.  
The theory of first occupancy and possession at common law are useful allocation 
theories. However, they provide weak arguments for the creation of private property in carbon 
assets. Consent of the commons that ownership of the resource is valid must exist before the 
rights in the resource can be allocated pursuant to these theories. For example, just because I am 
in possession of an animal defined as ―wildlife‖ under The Wildlife Act, 1998 does not mean 
property exists in that wildlife or that I have any right or property in that wildlife—legislation 
prevents me from acquiring property rights in that wildlife.
209
 Instead, if my possession 
contravenes the Act,
210
 I have not only committed a regulatory offence, but any interest I may 
have may be forfeited to the Crown. It is society‘s beliefs, as set out in The Wildlife Act, 1998, 
rather than possession, which dictate when property rights can be created in wildlife. The theory 
of first occupancy and possession at common law are unable to justify the creation of private 
property rights in carbon assets as they are unable to provide a case for the ownership of carbon 
assets.  
 
3.5.3 Labour 
Encouraging labour increases productivity.
211
 Based on the theory of labour, the creation 
of private property rights in carbon assets should increase investment in carbon sequestration 
above land best management practices since private land managers would be entitled to the 
property rights in the products of their labour. If land managers who sequester carbon are 
rewarded for their efforts with private property, they will have an incentive to engage in 
sequestration activities they otherwise would not have, thereby increasing the amount of carbon 
sequestered. If numerous land managers sequester carbon above equilibrium, carbon stored in 
biomass should reduce the level of carbon that would otherwise be stored in the atmosphere, and 
thus mitigate the effects of excessive carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.  
                                            
209
 The Wildlife Act, 1998, S.S. 1998, c. W-13.12. 
210
 For example, I do not have a licence to possess the wildlife.  
211
 Cohen, supra note 149 at 468. See also Locke.  
48 
 
The theory of labour is based on Locke‘s influential theory of initial ownership and 
justification of private property.
212
 The theory of labour holds that it is morally right that an 
individual who uses his labour to produce should be entitled to the products of his labour. 
Intuitively, it seems unfair that an individual who labours could be forced to share the products 
of that labour with individuals who do not expend their labour. In Second Treatise on 
Government, Locke starts with the proposition that the world belongs to no one.
213
 Man, 
however, owns property in his person and has the ability to combine human labour with elements 
of nature to create property in which the entrepreneur has sole rights:
214
 ―The Labour of his 
Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes 
out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and 
joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.‖215 Once property is 
created and allocated by the theory of labour, property rights to that res can be transferred by 
sale, gift, or other means.
216
 
 While, theoretically, private property rights increase investment in a resource, it is 
interesting to explore whether, given the characteristics of carbon assets and the nature of the 
carbon market, private property in carbon assets justified pursuant to the theory of labour 
increases carbon sequestration and carbon sink retention. This thesis examines whether private 
property in carbon assets is able to encourage labour generally and, as desired by legislators 
using private property in carbon assets in carbon policy, encourage labour above business-as-
usual.  
First, we explore whether private property in carbon assets is able to encourage labour. 
Costa Rica‘s pagos por servicios ambientales [Payments for Environmental Services] was not 
able to encourage investment in carbon assets as the market was not able to distinguish between 
between forests which were and were not in need of protection. 
The first carbon market, Costa Rica‘s Payments for Environmental Services, rewarded 
land managers in the 1990s for protecting forests.
217
 Farmers were given the opportunity to sell 
carbon storage capacity of forests on their land through a national program aimed at preserving 
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forests and reforesting ‗degraded‘ land. 218 The Program was administered by Fondo Nacional de 
Financiamiento Forestal, a public forestry-financing agency created under Costa Rican law, and 
paid for through a consumer tax on fossil fuels and a $2 million (US) sale to Norway of 200 
million tonnes of carbon sequestration.
219
 Costa Rica recognized private property rights in 
carbon storage capacity, and redistributed money to its land mangers to promote the health of 
forests. The program attempted to induce the labour of current and future land managers through 
easements registered against land in order to promote the desired environmental benefits.  
Pfaff et al. show that the Program had little effect on forest preservation during the years 
they examined, from 1997-2000.
220
 One of the reasons for the lack of efficiency was that the 
Program enrolled lands which would have remained forested even without payments.
221
 Those 
interested in retaining forests applied for compensation while those with plans to remove timber 
from their lands did not. There was no way to force those land managers who intended to 
deforest to subscribe to the program. Pfaff et al. conclude that the Program would have been 
more successful had it targeted at-risk areas.
222
 The inability of the Program to distinguish 
between land managers who expended labour to protect forested land and land managers who 
maintained the status quo showed that markets are unable to induce labour in areas where 
deforestation was preferred by land managers, and wasted administrative resources in rewarding 
business as usual.  
 The next question is whether the creation of private property in carbon will encourage 
labour that results in environmental benefits. The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Scheme suggests that the market may not be able to encourage above business-as-usual 
entrepreneurial sequestration activities.  
 The New South Wales (―NSW‖) Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme is a mandatory 
emissions trading scheme created on January 1, 2003 aimed at reducing emissions associated 
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with the production and use of electricity.
223
 Energy retailers are required to meet targets based 
on their share of the energy market.
224
 NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Certificates (―NGAC‖), 
which represent one tonne of CO2e of avoided emissions, can be surrendered by energy retailers 
to meet targets. These Certificates can be created through low-emission generation, activities 
involving waste methane, demand-side activities, and sequestration activities. These Certificates 
serve to create property interests in promoted activities. 
 Passey, MacGill, and Outhred analyzed the Scheme for the 2003, 2004, and 2005 
compliance years to assess the Scheme‘s performance.225 Passey et al. determined that, in 
addition to the Scheme not promoting reductions in emissions as claimed and NGAC cash flow 
being concentrated with select sequestration participants, the Scheme was being funded by 
electricity consumers who paid participants ―not actually undertaking genuine, non-BAU 
[business-as-usual], abatement activities‖.226 Participants were being rewarded for maintaining 
the status quo, although the status quo did not produce emissions savings, as was the intention of 
the Scheme. Thus, the Scheme failed to produce the desired environmental benefits (but may 
have increased electricity costs to consumers). These issues are not isolated to the NSW Gas 
Abatement Scheme. Passey et al. noted that many of the problems encountered are ―inherent in a 
baseline and credit scheme‖,227 meaning offsets are unable to distinguish between business-as-
usual activities, which would have occurred without the existence of the property rights, and 
legitimate sequestration projects.  
 Apart from the NSW market failure explored above, academic analysis suggests that 
private property rights in carbon assets will be unable to encourage labour above business-as-
usual. Skole, Smalligan and Samek find that market prices are not high enough to promote 
significant investment in carbon sequestration projects on agricultural land. Professor Skole et al. 
concluded that for it to be economical to replace corn production land with forest land under a 
cap and trade offset program, conservative estimates indicate that carbon prices would have to be 
as high as $78-$122 per ton CO2e to compete with the current market value of corn (not 
                                            
223
 Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme, ―Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme‖, online: Government of New South 
Wales GGAS <http://greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au/>. 
224
 Ibid.  
225
 Rob Passey, Iain MacGill, Hugh Outhred, ―The NSW Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme: An analysis of the 
NGAC Registry for the 2003, 2004 and 2005 Compliance Periods‖ (August 2007), online: Centre for Energy and 
Environmental Markets <http://www.ceem.unsw.edu.au/content/userDocs/CEEM_DP_070827_000.pdf>. 
226
 Ibid. at 30-31. 
227
 Ibid. at 30. In the baseline and credit approach, firms earn credits for emissions below their baseline.  
51 
 
including the cost of land conversion, the cost of carbon measurement and verification, or the 
future discontinuance of revenue when tree growth stabilizes in 15-30 years).
228
 Stavins and 
Richards estimated the cost of carbon sequestration, rather than the cost of land-use changes as 
determined by Skole et al., by examining 11 previous analyses of carbon sequestration costs in 
the United States. Stavins and Richards found the cost of carbon sequestration ranges from US 
$7.50 - $22.50 per metric ton of CO2e.
229
 As seen in the next paragraph, current economic 
returns are insufficient to induce the desired labour.  
 Even when land is already suitable for sequestration projects, and there is no land-use 
change involved, it is unlikely the price of carbon credits will be high enough to influence land 
management decisions. The price of carbon credits may not even be high enough to entice land 
managers into applying for a recognition of their sequestration activities.
230
 As a reference, the 
Chicago Climate Exchange market price per metric ton of CO2e in January 2009 ranged from 
$1.65 to $2.15
231
 and Alberta‘s carbon offset credits are currently $15 per tonne of CO2e.
232
 
Based on the experiences of the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme rewarding business-
as-usual activities, of producers not applying for recognition of carbon credits in Alberta‘s 
Emissions Regulation and Offset System, and the high costs of achieving sequestration through 
land use changes, the economic returns are insufficient to entice the desired labour. Therefore, 
creating property rights in carbon assets pursuant to the labour theory justification will not 
encourage useful labour above that already being engaged in as business-as-usual. 
Because of the lack of the requisite conditions for a perfect carbon market
233
 and the 
existence of the conditions for market failure,
234
 this section rejects private property as justified 
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by the theory of labour. The perfect market does not exist at this time for carbon assets. The only 
purchasers of property rights in carbon assets are those who have been legislated to do so under 
legislation, a small and select group. As seen by the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme, 
these purchasers are likely to purchase offsets from sequestration participants who are connected 
to the purchaser in some way.
235
 The product created by the sequestration participants, although 
homogeneous, is widely available as it can be created by land managers engaging in business-as-
usual best management practices.
236
 Thus, demand is low, supply is high, and purchases are not 
always at arms-length. Further, the real prices are not related to the ideal prices. The cost to 
sequester one ton of above business-as-usual CO2e is much higher than the cost to purchase an 
offset credit representing the sequestration of ton CO2e.
237
 Thus, minimal investment projects 
will be pursued as genuine expenditures of labour, although possibly more environmentally 
beneficial, will be onerous by comparison to business as usual activities. For example, a farmer 
will not operate at an economic loss by expending $78-$122 per ton CO2e produced to convert 
his land from profitable corn production to forest when he can supplement his current income by 
claiming credit for the no-till activities in which he already engages. 
 When a market failure occurs, such as the one seen in carbon assets, the accepted solution 
is to rearrange the property right.
238
 Coase, for example, argues that appropriately designed 
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property rights can internalize externalities without government intervention.
239
 Coase, 
obviously, is advocating for the reallocation of private property rights. As an example, when 
there is a conflict over whether cigarette smoking is or is not allowed in a room, the conflict is 
determined based on who is willing to pay the most for the benefit; if the value of fresh air to the 
non-smoker exceed the value of smoking to the smoker, then the non-smoker could compensate 
the smoker for loss of the ability to smoke, and vice versa.
240
  
 However, private property rights to the environment cannot be rearranged to ―take care of 
externalities without direct government intervention‖. 241 The environment does not have the 
ability to hold property or purchase benefits, as seen in the purchasing the option to smoke 
example above. Thus, in a market, environmental protection requires either government 
intervention or property-owning individuals to advocate for the environment. Because the basics 
of the competitive market are rational, self-interested consumers and rational, profit-maximizing 
firms,
242
 both consumers and firms have the ability to exploit carbon credits for financial gain, 
and in the process may exploit the environment. Who, in this scenario, is advocating for the 
environment?  
Rose examines this issue. She describes market failure as occurring “where Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand fails to guide privately owned resources to their socially optimal uses, 
most often because some individuals have interests that are left out of the market 
transactions.”243 Market failures will result in instances where preferences are not expressed 
completely through market transactions, where a natural monopoly is ideal, or where investment 
is unattractive to private individuals because non-investing users cannot be excluded from 
enjoying the benefits of the investment.
244
 The inability of the environment to be included in 
market transactions without government intervention or government ownership of property rights 
indicates that, as explored further in chapter 4, legislators should have scrutinized private 
property rights in carbon assets prior to their creation as these property rights, in a free-market, 
will result in market failure.   
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3.6 Conclusion 
 Private property in carbon assets is not justified by property theory. As seen in this 
chapter, when private property rights in carbon assets are used in the carbon market, they pervert 
the market, preventing the market from achieving desired outcomes. Policies which advance 
unjustified property rights or inaccurately describe property rights will not be successful as the 
property rights will not function as predicted and desired.  
 Utilitarian arguments which justify private property are not able to do so for carbon. 
Utilitarian arguments are unable to demonstrate how private property in carbon assets will 
achieve the greatest good. These arguments fail to take into account the numerous reasons for the 
existence of climate change and the need for a locational and land manager focused approach to 
encouraging sustainable investment in carbon sequestration. There is no one-size-fits-all scheme 
which will mitigate the effects of climate change: a program which successfully encourages 
investment in carbon sequestration on agricultural land in Saskatchewan will not be useful to 
promote forest retention in Africa.  
 Both the personal self-assertion and special rights theories of property justify the holding 
of carbon assets as something other than private property. Personal self-assertion rejects private 
property rights in carbon assets because of the potential for these rights to interfere with land 
rights, land rights being connected to human development and the achievement of personhood. 
Special rights theories justify either non-property or common property in carbon assets, as this is 
the way in which carbon assets have historically been held.  
 Economic theory justifies private property rights in a resource to protect the resource 
from competition and to encourage investment in the resource. As carbon assets are not scarce, 
there is no reason to protect this resource from competition. If anything, society wants to 
encourage as many people as possible to take advantage of the process of photosynthesis to 
sequester atmospheric carbon. Further, the economic theory for justifying private property rights 
is unable to encourage investment in the resource as there is little inherent value in carbon as 
mere carbon compared to carbon as a component of a marketable commodity, such as lumber.  
 The rights-based doctrine of first occupancy and the common law of first possession are 
unable to justify property rights in any type of resource, including carbon assets, as they are in 
essence theories of allocation. The rights-based theory of labour, however, gives us reason to 
pause. Some aspects of justifying private property in carbon assets based on the labour theory 
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seem to work; private property rights (with associated economic value) create an incentive for 
private persons to invest in carbon sinks on privately held land. Private property rights in carbon 
assets also encourage land managers to consider the consequences of their land management 
decisions on the carbon cycle. Market failures, however, have created a situation in which 
business-as-usual activities are able to create private property in carbon assets, thus a windfall 
for persons awarded carbon property rights at the expense of the success of carbon policies.  
 Yet, even with property theory unable to provide any sound justification for property 
rights in carbon assets, legislators have and are creating property rights in carbon assets to be 
used in a carbon market. These carbon markets are, as property theory predicts, failing. Instead 
of abandoning the idea of private property in carbon assets, legislators are attempting to solve the 
problems the markets are experiencing while retaining private property in carbon assets. Chapter 
4 will show that carbon markets using property rights in carbon assets cannot be repaired as the 
property on which these markets are based is flawed.  
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CHAPTER 4: PROPERTY RIGHTS DISTORT THE ISSUES 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This thesis has found that the creation of private property rights in natural cycles, 
including the carbon cycle, is inappropriate. However, because human interference prevents the 
carbon cycle from existing naturally and because legislators desire to manipulate the carbon 
cycle to achieve climate change goals, this thesis re-examines whether there is a justification of 
private property which is capable of justifying private property rights in carbon assets. Every 
justification of private property is rejected except the rights-based theory of labour, which, in 
principle, shows promise. The theory of labour is ultimately rejected as a justification of private 
property in carbon assets because of documented offset market failures. Chapter 4 now question 
whether, if the perfect market existed, private property rights in carbon assets would be 
acceptable. This chapter concludes that it is not the market that prevents legitimacy of property 
rights in carbon assets, but that it is the property rights themselves that are flawed.  
Economists occasionally consider the role of property in achieving perfect competition. 
Rittenberg and Tregarthen, for example, identify the required characteristics of property rights in 
a market as:
245
 
1. Property rights must be exclusive (or, the owner of a property right must have the 
ability to prevent others from using the property right); and, 
2. Property rights must be transferable.  
Yet, economists do not question the existence or legitimacy of private property. Instead, 
economic theory presumes that every resource can be the subject of private property rights.
246
 
Private property rights in a resource are only controversial when there is a market failure,
247
 
which, as shown in chapter 3, exists in the case of carbon assets. This thesis rejects the 
presumption that property can exist in any resource – property rights are only acceptable when 
legitimate.  
 Determining the legitimacy of private property rights in a resource is separate and distinct 
from whether a perfect market can and/or does exist in a resource. More explicitly, just because 
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property can theoretically be created in any resource does not mean that property should be 
created in ever resource and/or that property rights are sustainable in every resource. As already 
explored in chapter 2, the property rights must be definable, identifiable, assumable and 
controllable for the property rights to exist.
248
 Further, the subject of those property rights must 
be physically, legally and morally excludable.
249
  
An extreme example of an instance where property rights are not appropriate, even when 
every condition of a perfect market exists, is property rights in kidnapped children. It is 
conceivable that a market in kidnapped children could be created which allows for perfect 
competition, no externalities, no information asymmetries, and no public goods, yet it would be 
morally outrageous to allow this property to be created. Apart from the issues of recognizing 
property rights in humans, parents would live in constant fear that their child would be 
kidnapped and sold to individuals who desire a child for any variety of reasons, such as 
inexpensive labour or human affection. In this market, kidnappers would personally profit from 
their morally reprehensible actions and the most successful kidnappers would be those that could 
identify and obtain prized characteristics in children, a weird test for success as defined by the 
market.   
 In the case of private property rights in carbon assets, analogous to property rights in 
kidnapped children, it is the recognition of the property rights, rather than the existence or non-
existence of the conditions for a perfect market, that is the problem. To prove this statement, this 
chapter begins by examining the legal effectiveness of private property rights in carbon assets. 
The chapter also looks at how property in carbon assets distorts issues and relationships, whether 
property rights can accomplish the multiple, competing objectives they have been created to 
achieve, how the inherent rigidity and boundaries of property law will harm carbon policies, and 
the inability of legislators to control carbon policies which rely on a carbon offset market.  
Theorists and economists are examining how carbon markets using private property in 
carbon assets can be ―tinkered with‖ in a way which will results in their success.250 This chapter 
will show that success of carbon markets and carbon policies will not be achieved by 
restructuring markets relying on private property in carbon assets. Instead, offset markets relying 
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on private property in carbon must be wholly abandoned and resources redistributed for society‘s 
climate change policies to be successful. 
 
4.1  Legitimacy of Property Rights 
 Using Bentham‘s subordinate ends of subsistence, equality, abundance, and security, this 
section demonstrates why property theory is unable to justify the creation of private property 
rights in carbon assets; these property rights are contrary to society‘s social, legal, administrative, 
and environmental goals. Property rights in carbon assets jeopardize security of food and food 
production, complicate land tenure, and are administratively wasteful. Ultimately, success is 
more likely to occur when carbon assets are held publically rather than privately.  
This section looks at whether, in a way which promotes subsistence, equality, abundance, 
and security, a private property distribution of rights and obligations in carbon assets is able to 
achieve: 
 the social goal of not threatening security or abundance of food and food production; 
 the legal goal of not complicating land tenure; 
 the administrative goal of receiving a satisfactory return on society‘s financial 
investment; and, 
 the environmental goal of increasing the amount of carbon sequestered in biomass and 
soil organic content. 
In addition to the environmental, social, legal, and administrative goals identified above, 
there are many other societal goals which could be examined to determine whether the existence 
of private property in carbon assets is justified. For example, instead of exploring the legal goal 
of not complicating land tenure, this thesis could have chosen to explore whether property rights 
in carbon assets can be integrated with existing laws and policies, whether carbon property is 
accessible, whether property rights in carbon assets are of a nature that they can be sufficiently 
legally protected, and whether, because of the assumed sui generis nature of carbon assets, the 
rights can be implemented rapidly enough to meet the environmental goals of society. Security 
of food, not complicating land tenure, receiving a satisfactory return on society‘s financial 
investments, and increasing the amount of carbon sequestered in biomass are among some of the 
most significant concerns we should have when considering whether private property in carbon 
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assets is justifiable. As seen below, the goals chosen for analysis are also a good starting point to 
the discussion of the practical implications of creating private property rights in carbon assets.  
This thesis uses the work of Bentham to set out an objective standard against which to 
evaluate the appropriateness of private property rights in carbon assets. Bentham‘s work is 
considered influential as he recognized that legal effectiveness, rather than divine 
commandments, societal mores, or human rights, is the foundation of all laws. This thesis takes 
the same approach: for a policy or law to achieve social, administrative, and environmental 
goals, that policy or law must foremost be able to achieve its intended results.  
 
4.1.1 Bentham 
Bentham held that legislators‘ goal should be ―the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number of the individuals belonging to the community in question‖.251 As Bentham found the 
―greatest happiness‖ to be indeterminable, he proposed the happiness of the commons is to be 
advanced by the subordinate ends of subsistence, abundance, equality, and security.
252
 
Bentham‘s subordinate ends are not equal; security is the pre-eminent object because 
subsistence, abundance, and equality are all measured in the present moment whereas security 
takes into account the present as well as the future.
253
 Further, Bentham holds equity to be less 
favoured than subsistence and abundance.
254
  
Subsistence is achieved when citizens possess at least the minimum necessities for 
survival. Bentham asks what the law can do for subsistence, and answers: ―Nothing directly. All 
it can do is to create motives, that is, punishments or rewards, by the force of which men may be 
led to provide subsistence for themselves."
255
 Abundance is the acquisition of goods above the 
level of subsistence. Bentham held that laws do not have to be made requiring individuals to 
strive for property greater than subsistence, but instead abundance will occur if the government 
does nothing except provide protection for private property and industry.
256
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Law creates security. Security is the protection of life and property by the law. In 
reference to Bentham‘s ideas on security, Steintrager states: ―the principal task of government is 
to see that individuals do not threaten each other‘s life or invade each other‘s property; and 
government itself must not take any unwarranted action which would threaten life or 
property.‖257 Security must be the utmost goal as subsistence and abundance cannot exist without 
security: ―Law does not say to man, Labour, and I will reward you; but it says: Labour, and I 
will assure you the enjoyment of the fruits of your labour – that natural and sufficient 
recompense which without me you cannot preserve; I will insure it by arresting the hand which 
may seek to ravish it from you.‖258 Equality is also connected to security: ―the only equality 
which can exist in a [state without law] is an equality of misery‖.259    
This thesis uses Bentham‘s subordinate ends as a reference for what legislative or public 
policy concerns should be in relation to property in carbon assets, but does not advance the views 
of Bentham as a whole. For example, Bentham attempts to show in various writings that 
protecting limitless private property and a free market results in the greatest happiness.
260
 Yet, 
this thesis finds that private property is not appropriate for carbon assets. Thus, while equality, 
subsistence, abundance and security will be recurring themes throughout this chapter, the 
conclusion ultimately reached does not necessarily conform to Bentham‘s ultimate opinion that 
limitless private property and a free market is best for society.  
 
a.  Security of Food 
As seen in the rights-based sections, rights-based theorists strongly argue that legal rules 
must exist which ensure that individuals can access the resources needed for their survival. Some 
theorists even contend that individuals have the right to those resources needed for survival.
261
 In 
any case, legislators must always be aware of how policies influence the ability of the earth‘s 
seven billion individuals to attain at least the minimum necessities for subsistence.
262
 As carbon 
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sequestration policies influence the use of scarce arable land, the legal framework associated 
with carbon assets must balance food production with carbon sequestration goals.  
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations recognizes that 
agroforestry tends to sequester greater quantities of carbon than agricultural production.
263
 
Although there are valuable incidental benefits of agriforestry, such as improved farm family 
livelihoods and climate change adaptation,
264
 agriforestry can and does remove land from food 
production. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization notes that there are, at present, 
several examples of private companies investing in agroforestry on private land in exchange for 
carbon benefits.
265
 Encouraging agroforestry will impact the amount of arable land remaining for 
agriculture.
266
  
Arable land is a finite resource which must be put to its best use to support the world‘s 
population. When carbon assets are privatized, the market will continue to determine how scarce 
land will be used, usually with reference to what is most economically advantageous. If 
agroforestry becomes more profitable than growing corn because of the existence of carbon 
offsets, arable land will be removed from food production because most land managers will 
maximize their economic return.
267
 Care must be taken that ―economic productivity‖, as 
influenced by sale of property rights in carbon, does not interfere with the best use of land (from 
an overall, societal perspective). 
In addition to the amount of land available for crop production, carbon sequestration may 
also dictate a land manager‘s use of her land. An argument has been made that property rights in 
carbon will act like an agricultural or agroforestry subsidy and be economically profitable to land 
managers.
268
 However, assigning property rights to carbon to empower land managers creates 
immediate economic benefits for land managers, but has the potential to result in long term 
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oppression.
269
 The short-term economic agricultural subsidy obtained from entering into 
conservation easements or selling property rights in carbon sinks may result in long-term 
obligations which create inequality between the land manager and the holder of the carbon right 
and potentially threaten that land manager‘s subsistence. For example, once the land manager 
transfers her carbon rights, the purchaser of the new carbon rights holder may have the ability to 
dictate the land manager‘s use of her land. A producer that converts cropland to perennial cover 
to obtain carbon credits (or another form of recognition of her interest in carbon property) and 
who subsequently sells these carbon credits may be forced to retain the perennial cover under the 
sales agreement even though returning the land to crop would be more economically 
advantageous.
270
 Further, if the obligation to retain perennial cover runs with the land, the new 
owner of the land will also be burdened. 
Because of carbon property rights encouraging the removal of arable land from 
agricultural production, and because carbon rights have the potential to interfere with land 
managers‘ use of their land, carbon property has the potential to influence the price of food. 
Carbon rights may increase the price of food, thereby increasing the amount of money an 
individual requires to meet her basic needs. As seen by the demand for corn for ethanol 
production, the price of corn in the United States rose by more than 50 percent between April 
2007 and April 2008.
271
 The increase in the price of corn consequently increased the demand for 
cropland and the price of animal feed. In turn, the price increase of many farm commodities in 
the United States, such as soybeans, meat, poultry, and dairy products, were directly linked to the 
use of corn for ethanol production.
272
 Land previously used to grow soybeans was used to 
produce corn for ethanol production instead.
273
 Further, as corn can be used to feed animals, 
animal producers had to secure another type of animal feed or compete with ethanol producers to 
obtain corn.
274
 The same outcome may be predicted for carbon. If agricultural land is converted 
to agroforestry land because pursuing carbon rights is more economically efficient than 
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producing food, the reduction in food production will consequently decrease the supply of food 
and increase its cost.
275
 
Private property rights in carbon assets have the potential to interfere with the land 
available on which to produce food, the price of food, and the land management activities of 
food producers. The question asked in this section is whether commoditization of carbon assets 
is worth jeopardizing subsistence and security of food. In the case of carbon assets, this risk is 
unjustifiable. Further, as seen later in this chapter, environmental success will likely be greater if 
private property rights do not exist in carbon assets.  
 
b. Private Property in Carbon will Complicate Land Tenure 
 Takacs argues that for forest carbon projects to be effective, the associated property rights 
must run with the land.
276
 However, property rights in carbon which run with the land will only 
be accepted if they do not excessively offend security of land tenure.  
Incorporeal property rights in carbon assets give the rights holder some control over land 
use decisions,
277
 allowing the rights holder to manage the land in or on which the carbon sink is 
located to maximize the legal, environmental, and economic benefits of the carbon property 
right. For example, the Australian state of New South Wales created a profit à prendre in 
forestry rights, which may mean ―a carbon sequestration right in respect of the land‖, which can 
be registered on both freehold land
278
 and leasehold land
279
 entitling the interest holder:  
(i) to enter the land and establish, maintain and harvest (or to maintain and harvest) a 
crop of trees on the land, or  
(ii) to enter the land and establish, maintain and harvest (or to maintain and harvest) a 
crop of trees on the land and to construct and use such buildings, works and facilities as 
may be necessary or convenient to enable the person to establish, maintain and harvest 
the crop, …280  
 
Interests in real property and other interests registerable on land title have the potential to 
complicate land tenure and threaten security of land use. Yet, registering carbon property rights 
in land registry systems is required to provide security of legal rights and environmental benefits. 
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For example, in relation to New South Wales‘ property rights in carbon examined above, since 
Australian law presumes those who own land also own all resources on it, including soil and 
trees, registration is necessary to separate property rights in carbon assets from property rights in 
land.
281
 Further, the New South Wales‘ carbon rights holder will have, through registration, 
clearly defined and announced to the world her carbon rights, providing protection against 
subsequent land owners from encroaching on her rights. In addition to registered incorporeal 
rights in carbon assets providing security to carbon rights holders, real property interests in 
carbon assets promote environmental subsistence; once an interest is created in a carbon sink, 
should the land be sold, the new land owner would be required to respect the interest.  
Although the categories of interests in land are not closed, the creation of new interests in 
land is carefully controlled by the courts.
282
 In 1834, Keppel v. Bailey ruled against the 
development of new and unusual estates in, and burdens upon, land.
283
 The Court held: ―great 
detriment would arise and much confusion of rights [would ensue] if parties were allowed to 
invent new modes of holding and enjoying real property.‖284 Instead, courts recognize a limited 
number of carefully regulated interests in land pursuant to the doctrine of numerous clausus, 
Latin for ―closed number‖.285 A modern day example of the court continuing to limit interests 
which burden land is Durham Condominium Corporation No. 123 v. Amberwood Investments 
Ltd.
286
 The Ontario Court of Appeal held that positive covenants contained in reciprocal 
easements and cost sharing agreements are unenforceable when the ownership of land 
changes.
287
  
If property rights in carbon assets are to run with the land, they will likely be in the form 
of a sui generous interest.
288
 For example, although the Australian states of South Wales, South 
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Australia, Tansmania, and Queensland categorize a right to sequestered carbon as a profit à 
prendre, using this common law concept is inaccurate. While a profit à prendre gives a rights 
holder the right to take something from another‘s land, such as crops, timber, soil, minerals or 
animals on the land, sequestration involves putting carbon into the land.
289
 Whatever form the sui 
generous carbon property interest takes, the interest must not offend the rational for the 
numerous clauses principle: 1) that the new interest does not increase information costs, 
including those associated with the acquisition of real property; and, 2) that the new interest does 
not create an anticommons problem, where the existence of numerous right-holders in the same 
res prevents the efficient use of the res.
290
 Ziff also suggests a further rational for the numerous 
clauses principle is that property rights are difficult to abolish once created.
291
    
In the tragedy of the anticommons,
292
 too many property interests in land can fracture 
property right entitlements and can paralyze the use of the land. As seen by the splintering of 
property rights in post-communist Moscow, storefronts remained empty while street kiosks were 
abundant.
293
 So many individuals had property rights in each storefront that a transactional 
gridlock occurred.
294
 No one person could control the use of the asset or resource, preventing its 
efficient use or any use at all. Thus, while right holders bickered about the way in which the 
asset/resource would be used, it remained unused even though the storefronts were in great 
demand. One need not be very imaginative to analogize the creation of additional carbon-based 
property rights in land with the storefront anticommons. Should carbon property run with the 
land, the property rights holder has the ability to permanently hinder or even separate the land 
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manager from land management decisions. When a forest matures, and thus does not have the 
ability to sequester further carbon or create further carbon credits, the land manager will not be 
able to generate income from carbon credits and, as restricted by carbon rights, may not be able 
to otherwise deal with the land. Unless the land manager holds the carbon property rights in the 
forest or the carbon rights holder allows her property rights to be purchased or destroyed, the 
land manager will have no options – he cannot use the forest in a way which damages the carbon 
property rights, thus may not sell timber from the land or put the land to alternate use. Further, it 
is unlikely the land manager will be able to sell unprofitable land. Thus, the land manager will be 
required to pay property taxes on land for which the use and the prospect for development 
remain frozen.  
Yet, conservation easements,
295
 which can be described as being positive covenants 
which fracture land rights, are currently accepted in nine of Canada‘s ten provinces.296 Under the 
bundle-of-rights theory, numerous persons can have different rights in the same object of 
property, in this case land.
297
 The existence of conservation easements demonstrate that 
environmental encumbrances can be registered against real property in a way which does not 
always prevent security of land rights.   
As the conservation easement is able to protect, conserve, and enhance the 
environment,
298
 a similar, sui generis, property interest would be appropriate to protect carbon 
projects. Thus, while incorporeal rights in carbon assets may complicate land tenure, they need 
not threaten security of land rights to any greater extent than conservation easements. Security of 
land rights is not always put into risk by the creation of private property in carbon assets.  
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c. Not achieving administrative goals 
Resources earmarked for environmental projects are limited. As such, those resources 
must be used in such a way as to achieve optimum results. Administrative goals in relation to 
private property in carbon assets will only be achieved when society receives a satisfactory 
return on its financial investment.
299
 
Creating private property in carbon assets will, if the property is to be recognized and 
have value, require the creation of a regulatory system for administration and enforcement. 
Regulatory systems generate costs, which require the expenditure of resources. In most cases, 
regulatory systems governing market transactions are state sponsored.
300
  For example, even 
where some transaction costs are borne by individuals, criminal laws guard against theft and 
fraud and civil courts enforce contracts. An additional administrative burden facing property in 
carbon which is not experienced by other resources is the necessity for government intervention 
to occur to artificially create scarcity and value in carbon, as previously discussed.  
It is difficult to predict the cost of a private property regulatory scheme in carbon assets. 
However, by examining other regulatory systems which currently exist in Canada, it is easy to 
come to the conclusion that governments must be willing to expend significant resources to 
recognize and administer private property in carbon assets.  
 A relatively simple registry system, the Alberta land titles system, costs about $15 
million per year to administer.
301
 This figure would be lower than the costs of administering a 
carbon scheme. First, the $15 million per year figure provided only takes into account the costs 
of administrative operating expenses. The amount does not include the costs of establishing 
standards or enforcing property rights. Second, the Alberta land registration system has existed 
since 1910,
302
 and thus has had over a hundred years to evolve to maximize efficiency; land in 
the province has been previously surveyed and well defined rules exist. Finally, compared to a 
carbon property scheme, the land titles system is relatively easy to administer. A carbon 
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regulatory system will be more complicated as uncertainty will exist in the creation, 
quantification, continuance, transfer and enforcement of carbon rights. As just one example, the 
amount of sequestration which occurs in an agroforestry project depends on the density of 
vegetation, age and type of the trees, and the type of soils – none of which are relevant in a land 
titles system.
303
 
 The Government of Canada‘s Long-Gun Registry is also informative of the possible cost 
of a carbon property scheme. The long-gun program is intended to control the acquisition, 
possession and ownership of firearms, regulate certain types of firearms, prevent the misuse of 
firearms, and help law enforcement agencies prevent and investigate firearm crimes.
304
 When 
introduced in 1995, the Liberal government projected a long-gun registry would involve a net 
cost of $2 million.
305
 In 2001, the program cost $200 million annually to administer.
306
 By the 
summer of 2006, the costs of the registry exceeded $1 billion.
307
 The $1 billion figure does not 
include the costs of provincial enforcement or the costs of firearms owners and businesses to 
comply with the legislation.
308
 Like the long-gun registry and all new registries, the 
implementation of a carbon property scheme would require a negotiation for the assignment of 
rights, the creation of appropriate standards and institutions, costs for initial documentation, and 
costs related to compliance and enforcement. 
  Compared to the annual investment government would be required to make in 
administrating private property in carbon, public resources may be better used in a one-time 
contribution to a lasting, scientifically-directed project. For example, the $74 million program 
investment the Government of Canada made in the Permanent Cover Program, described further 
in chapter 5 as an alternative to the creation of private property in carbon assets, not only 
achieved numerous environmental goals, but returned carbon benefits with an estimated value of 
$72 - $362 million.
309
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In addition, it is anticipated that the transaction costs associated with carbon assets will 
be high relative to the value of the sequestered carbon.
310
 For example, apart from the costs of 
the regulatory system, IntercontinentalExchange, which currently conducts about 90 percent of 
the world‘s on-exchange emission trading, charges €3.50 per trade for the most common 
emissions contract.
311
 Environmental or economic results from private property in carbon assets 
will be required to justify the regulatory system and transactional costs. However, as seen in the 
next section, private property in carbon assets is unable to achieve the environmental results we 
require. Therefore, the money directed towards administering private property in carbon assets, 
which could be better used, will be misspent.  
 
d. Not Achieving Environmental Goals 
An examination of environmental degradation in the Western United States shows that 
privatization of carbon may not be the answer to promoting, conserving, or rehabilitating carbon 
assets. Distributing property rights in a way which encourages beneficial, rather than destructive, 
labour consequently promotes environmental subsistence and abundance. Researchers found that 
publically owned property best achieves environmental subsistence and abundance; private 
property owners were more likely to damage and less likely to promote recovery of the 
environment than public management because private property owners were more concerned 
about profits than environmental sustainability.
312
  
The American West is an interesting case study. Pasture lands cover several hundred 
million acres and, therefore, considerable potential exists for the generation of wealth from 
livestock farming. When the West was being settled, American governments had two options: 1) 
giving or selling the public range to private individuals; or, 2) retaining the range as federal 
property.
313
  
                                                                                                                                            
Permanent Cover Program‖ (August, 2007), online: Government of Canada <http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-
AAC/display-afficher.do?id=1187979341393&lang=eng>. 
310
 Kennett, supra note 4 at 193. See also the CCX.  
311
 ―Carbon Market: there‘s still time‖ Financial Times (February 14, 2012), online: The Globe and Mail 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-news/global-exchange/financial-times/carbon-
market-theres-still-time/article2337453/>. 
312
 Donald Worster, ―Cowboy Ecology,‖ in Under Western Skies: Nature and History in the American West 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 34-52.  
313
 I note that the American government outright rejected the tradition of Old World pastoralism.  
70 
 
Those who supported the privatization of the American West argued that privatization 
would avoid the irresponsible free-for-all of the 1880s and would give landowners the incentive 
to better manage the land, particularly by building fences. It was claimed that fences were vital to 
environment sustainability as fences would keep livestock out of areas that needed to recover, 
and would reduce erosion, depletion, and weedy invasion. Privatization, it was thought, would 
yield a higher economic return from the land while simultaneously leaving the environment 
healthier and more productive.
314
 
Those who supported the rangeland being held by the government felt that the commons 
had a right to hold this land collectively. They argued that the land had been acquired at the price 
of considerable blood money by the federal government on behalf of all the American people, 
and thus should remain public. Further, public ownership would ensure the greatest return for the 
greatest number of people. Those who argued for the land to remain collective property 
foreshadowed Worster‘s conclusions: ―the private entrepreneur simply could not be trusted to 
look out for the long-term ecological health of the range resource. He would tend to exploit 
rather than conserve it; making the pastures private would not be a reliable way to protect them 
for posterity. A better solution would be to create a centralized bureaucracy of disinterested, 
scientifically trained professionals to oversee the public range.‖315  
A combination of property ownership was created in the American West in which the 
government and private individuals owned different portions of the land. Generally, settlers 
chose the best land for their homesteads and the remainder, being the poor land, was left to 
public ownership. Worster cited a Michael Loring and John Workman study which compared 
range conditions on private and public land in a northeastern county of Utah. They found that 13 
percent of Forest Service acres were in excellent condition, compared to 4 percent of Bureau of 
Land Management Lands, and only 2 percent of private lands.
316
 They also found that 29 percent 
of non-federal lands were classified as poor, compared with only 14 percent of Forest Service 
lands and 16 percent of Bureau of Land Management lands.
317
 Worster concluded that 
scientifically-trained, disinterested supervisors and public land tenure generally provided for 
                                            
314
 Worster, supra note 312 at 42-3. 
315
 Ibid. at 43. 
316
 Ibid. at 49. 
317
 Ibid. at 49. 
71 
 
better protection of the range environment than private ownership.
318
 ―The completely laissez-
faire economy, the system in which private property is regarded as a moral absolute and 
individual greed is allowed to go unchecked, has amply demonstrated its destructive energies.‖319  
Worster‘s analysis of the American West found that the private individual is unwilling to 
allow for healing of lands as rehabilitation or reclamation efforts often decrease profits in the 
short-term. Ziff sets out additional reasons for why environmental policy requires a collaborative 
approach:
320
 
the internalization of environmental burdens is rarely, if ever, perfect. That is 
because the boundaries of privately owned lands cannot track perfectly all of the 
ecosystems within that physical space. A given landowner might wish to clear 
land for cultivation; all of the neighbouring owners might choose to do the same. 
Everyone might be perfectly entitled to do so, even though the upshot may be the 
destruction of a rich wildlife habitat, parcel-by-parcel. Without a coordinated 
approach, the natural environment is at the mercy of a large number of individual, 
self-interested, wealth-maximizing preference-seekers. 
 
The United States government had the knowledge and financial security to prevent degradation 
and allow recovery of stressed lands. Carbon, like the American West, is a resource that requires 
a long-term plan and proper management. As such, because carbon sinks can be located on 
private land, a co-ordinated, scientifically promoted approach must be taken to ensure the 
environmental success of any carbon asset strategy.  
Land owners would likely resist any direct interference with land management decisions; 
however, as explored further in chapter 5, education and incentive programs, such as the 
Permanent Cover Program, as well as making government programs such as Agrastability and 
advance payments under the Agricultural Marketing Programs Act dependent on implementing 
best management practices, are indirect ways for society to promote and protect carbon sinks on 
private land. Indirect ways to encourage carbon sequestration must be explored as creating 
private property in carbon is not encouraging environmental security. 
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4.2  Property in Carbon Assets Distorts Relationships 
Property in carbon assets distorts issues and relationships. Instead of climate change 
being an environmental problem, the creation of private property in carbon assets makes climate 
change a property problem concerned primarily with the rights and obligations of property 
interest holders. 
Issues are perceived and resolved on the basis of associated legal rights. For example, in 
International News Service v. Associated Press, the United States Supreme Court was asked to 
decide whether there was property in news.
321
 International News Services obtained news stories 
collected by Associated Press and published these stories without attribution. In determining the 
question of whether news could be taken for use by another once appropriated, the Court first 
had to decide whether property should exist in news. The Court did this by assessing how 
property rules would influence legal relationships. On one hand, an individual who ―has gathered 
general information or news at pains and expense‖ should have rights and entitlements.322 On the 
other hand, ―information respecting current events…is not the creation of the writer, but is a 
report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris‖.323  
Property creates rights and entitlements. Thus, if Associated Press was given property in 
the news, Associated Press could exclude others from its property and prevent the spread of 
knowledge of news.
324
 Contrarily, non-property in news allows everyone to become informed of 
current events.
325
 Ultimately, the Court decided that access to knowledge of current events is 
essential, and thus found that news was not an appropriate subject of property.
326
 A monopoly on 
a news event would restrict society‘s access to information, and was thus deemed detrimental.327  
If property is created in carbon assets, an emitter is able to legitimize her emissions by 
purchasing carbon offsets, changing the relationship between society and the emitter from 
disapproval to either neutrality or something even positive. Instead of focusing on the negative 
consequences of emissions, private property in carbon offsets alters societal thinking. Societal 
approval is given to those emitters who do not adopt lower-emissions technology, but who 
instead purchase offsets, whether or not the offsets have been created from business-as-usual 
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activities, as the emitter is seen as acting in an environmentally sustainable manner. Offsets also 
create a relationship between emitters and sequesters where one traditionally did not exist. This 
relationship, depending on the rights granted by the sequesterer, may be one of oppression if it 
interferes with land management decisions. Further, offsets have the potential to turn 
sequesterers into the ―bad guys‖ of climate change. Should carbon credit contracts be breached 
because of a pest infestation or a forest fire, and carbon which was to be stored in the biotic sink 
is released, the responsibility for the increase in atmospheric carbon resides with the land 
manager who was unable to ensure the continued existence of the carbon sink.  
But, most importantly, private property rights in carbon offsets change the way society 
views climate change. Climate change is not a property problem. Climate change will not be 
resolved or worsened depending on whether property interests in carbon assets are defined as 
profits à prendre or as easements. Viewing climate change as a property problem ignores the 
need for society to make structural and behavioural changes.  
Property rights in carbon assets distract society from the real issues—how carbon 
emissions can be reduced and how climate change can be mitigated. Once property is created in 
carbon assets, disputes are resolved pursuant to property rules rather than sound environmental 
policy. Previously established property law – not designed for environmental concerns – has the 
potential to create perverse results such as legitimizing emissions and oppressing land managers 
who have previously engaged in sequestration activity. As in International News Service v. 
Associated Press, entitlements in carbon derived from property rights must be rejected to create 
the outcomes society desires – outcomes focused on environmental success rather than property 
rights.  
 
4.3  Multiple, Competing Objectives 
The creation of private property in carbon assets attempts to tackle three very different 
environmental issues and two different economic issues. The first environmental objective 
private property rights are attempting to achieve is the reduction and offsetting of emissions. As 
seen in section 3.3, offsets, however, are operating in a way which has the potential to allow for a 
net-increase in emissions. The second environmental objective is to create an incentive for land 
managers to invest in carbon sequestration. Yet, as seen in section 3.5.3, private property is more 
likely to reward business-as-usual activities than genuine sequestration projects as the price of 
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carbon is not high enough to result in land use change. Finally, the third environmental objective 
is the protection of carbon sinks. Prior to the creation of an offset market with associated rights 
in carbon assets, land use and land-use change in Canada was a net sink.
328
 This indicates that 
the business-as-usual activities of land managers are capable of protecting carbon sinks without 
property rights being created in carbon assets. Further, depending on the way property rights in 
carbon assets are structured, the purposeful destruction of sinks may allow entrepreneurs to 
benefit from the destruction of sinks and the creation of new sinks.  
 Apart from environmental benefits, one goal of the carbon markets may be to act as an 
economic stimulus while another may be to reduce the financial impact of environmental 
regulations on emitters. Carbon markets could be acting as an economic stimulus. In 2011, the 
total value of the global carbon market was estimated to be $142 billion and the trading of 
carbon credits garnered returns for the individuals associated.
329
 This $142 billion carbon market 
would not exist without the creation of private property rights in carbon assets. Further, an 
argument has been made that property rights in carbon could act like an agricultural or 
agroforestry subsidy and be economically profitable to land managers.
330
 The second economic 
goal, reducing the economic impact of environmental regulations, is also likely being achieved. 
For example, when President George H.W. Bush signed amendments to the Clean Air Act in 
1990 to allow for the trading of credits, economists estimated it saved sulfur dioxide emitters 
billions of dollars while allowing them to meet their emissions targets.
331
  
 It is interesting that the creation of private property in carbon assets may be meeting 
society‘s economic goals, while failing to achieve society‘s environmental goals. This is likely 
because environment and economic goals are in conflict. Climate change is the result of the 
market not internalizing the cost of environmental consequences in the price of transactions
332—
coal is used in production instead of wind-generated energy when coal is less expensive, even 
though coal causes greater environmental degradation than wind-generated energy. It is curious 
that global warming is described as ―the greatest market failure the world has ever seen‖,333 yet 
the approach to correcting this market failure is the creation of property rights in the carbon cycle 
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for use in the market. If economic values took precedence over environmental values to create 
climate change, it is unlikely the free-market will suddenly change its priorities to value 
environmental goals over economic goals. As seen by the European Union‘s Carbon Emissions 
Trading Market discussed later in this chapter, markets are primarily concerned with maximizing 
the economic returns of its participants, even when the result is to the detriment of the 
environment.   
Taking the conflict between economic and environmental goals out of the mix, creating 
private property in carbon assets will not be able to attain all of the environmental goals it 
purports to be able to achieve. Protecting carbon sinks requires a different instrument than 
promoting carbon sequestration. Likewise, promoting carbon sequestration requires a different 
tool than reducing emissions.  
While both protecting existing carbon sinks and encouraging carbon sequestration 
requires land managers to actively support whatever scheme is implemented, a different strategy 
is needed to protect carbon sinks than to encourage carbon sinks. This is because encouraging 
carbon sinks required promoting active labour whereas protecting carbon sinks, normally, 
requires maintaining the status quo. Stern, for example, advocates for a non-private property 
solution to the protection of forest sinks:
334
 
forest conservation and management projects, to be successful, need to be part of 
a much wider, integrated resource management programme. Many countries have 
national forest management programmes in place that increasingly take a broad 
inter-sectoral approach to the management and conservation of forests. They 
espouse a participatory approach to policy formation and planning, involving 
stakeholders at the local, sub-national and national levels. The more developed of 
these programmes are closely linked to higher level policy and planning 
frameworks, such as poverty reduction strategies, and provide a focus for 
directing development assistance. Such programmes can be amended so that, in a 
more targeted and effective way, they can tackle the main drivers to deforestation 
and unsustainable land use.  
 
While Stern promotes an integrated resource management program for sink retention, he 
supports ―Market based instruments … used alongside agricultural extension activity to 
encourage biological carbon sequestration.‖335 Although not all market based instruments depend 
on the creation of private property rights in carbon, Stern does recognize carbon trading, such as 
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that on the Chicago Climate Exchange, as being capable of promoting carbon sequestration.
336
 
While I do not agree with Stern, an economist, that private property  carbon assets are legitimate, 
his distinguishing between the best solutions for protecting sinks and encouraging carbon 
sequestration highlights the need for different approaches to solving different environmental 
problems or implementing different solutions.  
In examining the use of carbon markets to achieve reduced emissions while encouraging 
carbon sequestration, it is evident why sequestration and emission policies are in conflict. Under 
the carbon markets being proposed in Canada, for sequestration policies to be successful, 
emissions policies would be unsuccessful, and vice versa. This is because emissions above 
regulation motivate and finance investment in sequestration activities. Offsets, which 
compensate land managers for engaging in sequestration activities, are only required when 
emitters are unable to achieve their emissions standards, thus when society is not achieving its 
emissions goals. Conversely, if all emitters in an offset market convert to low-emissions 
technology and are able to meet their emission standards, there will be no demand to purchase 
property rights in carbon assets, thus no incentive for land managers to sequester.
337
  
 Markets are being implemented to achieve numerous environmental goals; yet, markets 
may not be the best approach to achieving any of these goals. Protecting carbon sinks requires an 
integrated resource management program. Encouraging carbon sinks above best management 
practices requires an economic incentive for land managers. And, although this thesis does not 
examine the best way to control emissions, Thomas Crocker, the first individual to present cap-
and-trade as a solution to certain environmental problems, advocates for an outright tax on 
carbon emission to reduce emissions.
338
 Each climate change goal requires a different tool to best 
meet the goal. It is unrealistic to believe property in carbon can achieve all of society‘s carbon 
policy goals, particularly because success in relation to one particular strategy could hinder the 
success of a different carbon strategy. A simple one-tool approach is not suited to solving a 
multi-faceted global problem. 
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4.4  Inherent Rigidity and Boundaries of Property Law 
Once property rights are created in carbon assets, historic property rules determine what 
rights and relationships are associated with carbon assets. Deciding environmental issues based 
on private property rights should be a concern when one considers traditional property rules have 
not been significantly changed for over a hundred years—when the global temperature was 
0.74°C cooler.
339
 Social issues can change quickly; property rules do not, or only do so slowly 
and for property-related reasons. Thus property rules are not capable of being moulded to deal 
with current environmental issues. For example, by creating property rights in carbon, Sir 
William Blackstone‘s property theory from 1766 is suddenly relevant: property becomes ―that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.‖340 The local, owner-
centric nature of the ownership model of property is incompatible with the global, environment-
centric nature of solutions to climate change. It is individuals putting personal gain and benefits 
over environmental protection which has caused climate change. Creating self-regarding 
property in carbon assets is unlikely to change this human behaviour.
341
 
The argument of advocates of the offset market approach is that property in carbon will 
manipulate individuals into behaving in an environmentally responsible manner. Economic 
theorists contend that, through the creation of private property in carbon, individuals engaging in 
self-serving activities, such as purchasing offsets to emit carbon or sequestering carbon for 
payment, will benefit, rather than harm, the environment. 
Ziff states the ―lure of property can serve as a vehicle for social engineering‖, or 
legislators can entice individuals to act in a certain manner through property rules.
342
 For 
example, settlement in the Prairies was promoted through homesteading incentives.
343
 However, 
in the case of property in carbon, legislators and policy-makers are confusing the use of existing 
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property to give effect to a public initiative with the questionable creation of new property to 
give effect to a public initiative.  
Property law was not designed to deal with nature‘s response to human activity. The 
functions of modern property law can be said to be the creation of order out of chaos by 
allocating and protecting rights and entitlements between individuals who may have conflicting 
claims
344
 and the promotion of commerce.
345
 Neither function of property is relevant to the 
carbon cycle. Property in carbon assets does not achieve the modern function of property law, 
and chapter 2 has found that creating property in natural cycles is inappropriate, thus private 
property in carbon assets cannot ―serve as a vehicle for social engineering‖ on which to base the 
environmental goal of mitigating the effects of climate change.
346
  
Through property rights functioning in the carbon market, and as examined in the section 
on how property rights change relationships, we are restructuring the problem of climate change 
to fit property rules rather than creating or adapting legal mechanisms to fit the problem of 
climate change. As examples: the price of carbon as private property is connected to supply-and-
demand, rather than from quantifying the economic damage of climate change; and, the ability to 
use land hosting a carbon sink is dictated by the registered property interest or the sales contract, 
rather than by community and environmental needs. Forcing a modern-day issue into a 
historically-created system for deciding legal property disputes is obstructing, rather than 
facilitating, our desired relationships and outcomes. 
 
4.5  Legislators Should Dictate Carbon Policy  
Once property is created in carbon assets for operation in a market, the property will take 
on a life of its own within the narrowly-focused market regime. Markets operate in such a way as 
to move towards maximizing profits or efficiency. Should property in carbon evolve in a way 
which prevents environmental goals from being achieved, it is very difficult for government to 
interfere in the operation of the market. For example, there is no government institution which 
can enforce property rights and obligations in another country. If the carbon market allows an 
emitter in Country A to receive credit for a carbon sequestration project located in Country B, 
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Country A is not able to force its property rights on the project proponent in Country B to ensure 
the sequestration project complies with Country A‘s standards. The market, and not regulators, 
will determine what are and are not sequestration projects and what rights and entitlements are 
associated with those sequestration projects.  
It is unlikely that governments will be able to guide the evolution of carbon property 
rights. Ellickson‘s efficiency theory suggests that, should carbon property be inefficient, it will 
either not survive or will evolve to increase efficiency.
347
 The CCX is an example of the market 
extinguishing inefficient property rights. The EU Market, on the other hand, is an example of the 
market evolving to increase efficiency. As seen by the European Union‘s Carbon Emissions 
Trading Market, which regulators are desperately attempting to control,
348
 the market is evolving 
to maximize economic benefits to market participants rather than providing environmental 
benefits.  
The European Union‘s Carbon Emissions Trading Market, the largest carbon market in 
the world, evolved to maximize economic efficiency of the market participants in a way which 
did not meet the original environmental goals of the market creators. The Market, launched on 
January 1, 2005 and involving 25 European Union countries, is intended to be the primary 
mechanism for achieving the Kyoto target of a collective 8 percent reduction in emissions.
349
 It 
distributes tradable instruments (choses in action) called ―European Union Allowances‖ to firms 
according to National Allocation Plans.
350
 The Market does not allow offsets created from biotic 
carbon sequestration at this time.
351
 
The market participants, in pursuit of economic gains, were active participants in the 
numerous issues experienced by the European Union‘s Carbon Emissions Trading Market. Some 
of the issues which can be directly related to participants pursing self-interest include: as 
allowances were distributed for free in the first stages of the markets, firms increased their 
emissions to ensure receiving larger allocations in the future; firms lobbied, and continue to 
lobby, for more generous allowances and a looser cap; emitters transitioned to inexpensive coal 
fired energy when over-allocation of carbon quotas caused the carbon price to drop; some 
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emitters received windfalls from the initial allocation of allowances; when the recession reduced 
demand for production, and consequently emissions, emitters sold their credits for profit;
352
 the 
system is acting as a front for money laundering;
353
 and, fraud and cyber-theft are prevalent.
354
  
Even if the market puts a price on carbon, prompting market participants to consider 
carbon in their economic decisions, the creation of private property in carbon assets simply 
changes the constitution of resources which have been privatized in the incompletely privatized 
environment. By privatizing carbon, interests still exist that are being left out of market 
transactions.
355
 Although the impact of climate change may be reduced, it may be at the cost of 
other environmental products, such as biodiversity.
356
 Now that private property has been created 
in carbon assets, unless governments are willing to pay market prices for an option, governments 
have generally lost the ability to guide carbon assets to their socially optimal uses.
357
 Since 
carbon markets left to their own devices are unlikely to evolve to maximize environmental 
efficiency, an analysis of why Adam Smith‘s invisible hand is not guiding resources to their 
socially optimal uses must still be undertaken.
358
 It seems contrary to regulating the environment 
that governments would willingly give up the limited control they have over natural cycles to the 
market, with little expectation that they will be able to fully control the market or that the market 
is capable of meeting environmental goals – even assuming, likely incorrectly, that the market 
participants all share those environmental goals.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Property rights in carbon assets, rather than the terms and conditions of offset markets, 
are causing carbon policies to fail. Private property rights in carbon assets are not functioning 
within carbon policies in a predictable or sustainable way because these property rights are not 
legally effective. The property rights threaten security of food, are administratively burdensome, 
and do not achieve the environmental benefited desired by legislators.  
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Property rights may, instead of being a tool for climate change mitigation, prevent society 
achieving climate change successes. It has not been shown how ineffective private property 
rights in carbon assets can reduce the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere. For climate 
change to be remedied, human attitudes and practices must be changed. Property, however, shifts 
the focus of carbon policy from environmental sustainability to the rights and entitlements 
promoted by the self-regarding nature of property. This is flawed.  
Property law is not designed or capable of responding to a complex, global problem 
caused by nature‘s response to detrimental human activities. While property has, in the past, 
been successfully used for social engineering, in the case of carbon assets, property is not 
legitimate, thus unpredictable and unsustainable in carbon policies. There is a difference between 
using legitimate property rights for social engineering and creating illegitimate property rights 
for social engineering. The latter will not be successful as the property rights will not be 
successful.  
Private property in carbon assets is not appropriate. Thus, private property rights in 
carbon assets should be abandoned. Yet, encouraging the creation of and protecting carbon sinks 
will be an element of climate change policy as carbon sequestration has great potential to reduce 
the concentration of atmospheric carbon and mitigate the effects of climate change. Therefore, 
chapter 5 examines some options for encouraging the creation and protection of carbon sinks 
which do not require the creation of property in carbon assets.  
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CHAPTER 5: THERE ARE BETTER WAYS TO 
ENCOURAGE BIOTIC SEQUESTRATION 
 
 Land managers are environmental stewards. These environmental stewards protect the 
health of the environment for the public‘s benefit. As such, it is appropriate that land managers 
be compensated for the environmental services they provide. It may even be considered a public 
responsibility to support programs which assist land managers with environmental conservation. 
In any event, when society has a specific environmental goal, such as increasing biotic 
sequestration, it is justifiable to use public money to achieve the mandate.  
 However, the creation of private property rights in carbon assets for use in an offset 
market is not the proper approach to encouraging land managers to engage in sequestration 
activities. For the reasons discussed throughout this thesis, greater environmental benefits will be 
attained by redirecting resources allocated to the creation of private property rights and carbon 
offset markets.  
 This chapter identifies approaches which show promise in protecting existing carbon 
sinks and encouraging carbon sequestration. Options which should be further explored in the 
face of the failure of private property in carbon assets and carbon markets include: 
 investing in scientific research; 
 creating and distributing information programs; 
 creating programs which target at-risk areas; 
 tying agricultural aid and subsidies to environmentally sustainable practices; and, 
 public ownership of critical land.  
This section is a brief overview of alternatives to private property in carbon assets and 
focuses on approaches directed at land mangers, the target of most carbon offset markets. 
Agricultural land management, rather than forestry land management, is primarily examined in 
this section because a large percentage, 93 percent, of forest land is publically owned, thus under 
the management of provincial or federal governments.
359
 Further, strategies for encouraging 
agroforestry and forestry land managers to engage in increased sequestration are numerous and 
diverse: an individual who grows Christmas trees can promote the carbon content of his soil in 
much the same way as agricultural producers; land managers growing trees for eventual use in 
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the pulp and paper industry require the scientific knowledge to properly manage the forest to 
maximize carbon sequestration; persons who retain forested land for environmental tourism, for 
nature conservation, or for sentimental reasons require completely different support and 
resources than those who use timber as a means of production.  
 
5.0.1 Carbon-Focused Research 
Advancements in science contribute to land use and land use change acting as a carbon 
sink, rather than a source of emissions. The work of researchers over the last 80 years to develop 
conservation tillage and reduce the use of summer fallow have resulted in cropland being a net 
sink of 4.4 Mt of carbon in 2008.
360
 Further, conservation tillage is a significant reason why 
existing carbon sinks on agricultural land are protected.  
Conservation tillage and the reduction of the use of summer fallow are best management 
agricultural practices which promote carbon sequestration in soil biomass.
361
 In Canada, the 
conversion from traditional tillage to conservation tillage and the decline in land managers 
engaging in summer fallow have been driven by governments (particularly Agriculture and Agri-
food Canada (―AAFC‖) and the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration (―PFRA‖), a former 
branch of AAFC), university researchers, agri-business companies, and farmers.
362
  For example, 
conservation tillage was explored by researchers as early as the 1930s and recognized at that 
time as a way to reduce soil disturbance, consequently increasing soil organic content and soil 
fertility. However, conservation tillage practices were not adopted in the 1930s because of issues 
with weed and disease control. With time, through developments attributed to the partnership 
between industry and scientific researchers,
363
 conservation tillage has become the farming 
practice of choice for lands under annual cultivation.  
The conservation tillage research of AAFC/PRFA and universities have dramatically 
changed the agricultural landscape.
364
 Land managers welcomed conservation tillage practices 
because it allowed for diverse crop rotations, reduced fallow, and provided for more efficient 
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weed, nutrient, moisture, and crop residue management.
365
 Conservation tillage further benefitted 
land managers by reducing labour, reducing energy consumption / fuel use, improving crop 
yields, improving soil productivity, and increasing fertilizer efficiency.
366
 As a consequence of 
conservation tillage, land managers engaging in best business practices are reducing soil erosion, 
reducing GHG emissions and promoting carbon sequestration through increased soil organic 
matter, increasing biodiversity, and improving water quality.
367
 Land managers are engaging in 
conservation tillage because of its economic benefit. An increase in crop yield, rather than the 
sale of carbon credits, provides an incentive to land managers to increase carbon sequestered in 
the biomass on their land. The environmental service that land managers provide by practicing 
the best management practice of conservational tillage is a pleasant consequence.   
There is great potential that researchers will discover further agricultural practices which 
achieve the same significant climate change mitigation results as the development of 
conservation tillage. Research has the potential to change the definition of ―business as usual‖, 
thus making it the norm to engage in agricultural practices which sequester carbon above what 
we currently define as business as usual. In addition to the invention of new technology, research 
also fits within Worster‘s conclusion that environmental conservation is best achieved through 
the guidance of scientifically trained, disinterested individuals
368
 and Stern‘s recognition that an 
integrated resource management program, particularly in forest management, is needed to 
achieve environmental success.
369
 As seen by the Permanent Cover Program, discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter, scientific research can direct resources to where they are needed the 
most or where they will be put to the most efficient use. Research has achieved and can achieve 
significant success in carbon sequestration and carbon sink protection without the creation of 
private property rights in carbon assets.  
 
5.0.2 Educational Programs 
The most environmentally sound agricultural practices are often also the most 
economically profitable practices as healthy soils are productive soils. Soil organic matter is a 
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key indicator of overall soil health.
370
 Soils with high organic matter are generally the healthiest 
and most productive soils.
371
 It has long been accepted by the agricultural sector that, without 
intervention, soil fertility declines over time as a result of tillage.
372
 Further, as written by Fowler 
in 1943, ―no one has ever advanced a scientific reason for plowing‖.373 Yet, some land managers 
are still set in their ways – they plow their soil black, losing the soil organic matter which would 
otherwise be locked in the soil.
374
 
Resistance to the conversion to conservation agricultural practices can, in most cases, be 
attributed to lack of knowledge.
375
 Informational programs which encourage agricultural 
producers to enter into or teach agricultural producers how use conservation methods of farming 
may have positive benefits for both the producer and for the environment. Providing educational 
resources to land managers to train them to use environmentally beneficial techniques which 
have positive influence on their livelihood and incidentally encourage the creation of and 
protection of carbon sinks is both relatively resource moderate and does not require the creation 
of property rights in carbon assets.  
 
5.0.3 Target At-Risk Operations 
 Short-term economic profits may deter land managers from engaging in the most 
environmentally beneficial practices. Further, distributing public resources, but failing to direct 
those resources to achieve the desired benefit, is improper.
376
 In instances where land managers 
and public funds are failing to protect the environment as desired, public funds may need focus 
on at-risk operations. A public program may be required, for example, to assist land managers in 
the conversion of marginal crop land under annual cultivation to permanent cover.  
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The drought of the 1980s and the subsequent Canadian Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry report entitled ―Soil at Risk – Canada‘s Eroding Future‖ encouraged a 
Federal-Provincial response to soil degradation.
377
 One component of Canada‘s National Soil 
Conservation Program was the Permanent Cover Program. Although the Permanent Cover 
Program was implemented primarily for soil conservation, other benefits achieved by the 
Program include improved water quality, enhanced wildlife habitat, and increased carbon 
sequestration.
378
  
 The Permanent Cover Program, introduced in 1989 with the intent of being available for 
subscription for three years, targeted marginal agricultural lands that had high erosion risk under 
annual cultivation. The Program paid farmers to convert eligible land to alternate sustainable 
uses under permanent cover contracts for either 10 or 21 years.
379
 Each permanent cover contract 
contained an option for Canada to purchase the Permanent Cover Program enrolled land, a clause 
invocable upon default of the permanent cover agreement. As an option to purchase is a 
registerable interest in land, a caveat was registered in the applicable land titles registry to protect 
Canada‘s interest for the length of the contract.380 Registering the caveat, and including terms 
and conditions in the agreement detailing Canada‘s remedy upon default, allowed Canada to 
circumvent the common law rule against positive covenants burdening real property.  
The 1989 Program was fully subscribed within the first few months.
381
 An expansion of 
the Program was announced in 1991 and was also quickly filled.
382
 Over 522,000 hectares of 
marginal land was converted to permanent cover under the Permanent Cover Program. As 
already mentioned in chapter 4, the Program required a 
$74 million program investment of public funds and returned environmental benefits valued at 
$72 - $362 million.
383
 This is significantly less resource burdensome and more environmentally 
beneficial than carbon markets. Under carbon markets, the carbon sequestration is neutralized by 
                                            
377
 Jill S. Vaisey, Ted W. Weins and Robert J. Wettlaufer, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, ―The Permanent 
Cover Program – Is Twice Enough?‖ (September 17-20, 1996), online: Government of Canada < 
http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-afficher.do?id=1187267959357&lang=eng>. 
378
 Ibid. 
379
 Ibid. 
380
 Although the obligation to engage in permanent cover did not run with the land, the option to purchase gave 
Canada notice when the land in issue was transferred to another individual. Canada, upon sale of the land, will 
request the producer to buy out of the remainder of the permanent cover agreement.  
381
 Vaisey, supra note 377. 
382
 Ibid. 
383
 Luciuk, supra note 309. 
87 
 
a corresponding emission and the creation of private property rights is predicted to cost millions 
of dollars to administer.     
 The benefits of the Permanent Cover Program endure. Ninety three percent of the 
individuals enrolled in the Permanent Cover Program declared that they will keep the forage 
stand as long as possible and just 18 percent indicate they plan to return their land to annual crop 
production.
384
 The Permanent Cover Program has permanently removed many hectares of 
marginal land from annual cultivation, incidentally promoting the sequestration of a significant 
amount of atmospheric carbon in biotic carbon mass.
385
  
 Critical lands cannot be targeted through the creation of property rights in carbon assets 
and use of carbon offset markets. Markets are indiscriminate. Scientifically trained, disinterested 
individuals are, however, in a position to identify environmental issues and create a recovery 
plan.
386
 As seen by the Permanent Cover Program, target projects, which do not create private 
property rights in carbon assets, can be very successful in encouraging carbon sequestration and 
the retention of carbon sinks.  
 
5.0.4 Tying Agricultural Aid and Subsidies to Environmentally Sustainable Practices 
 Depending on the appetite of program designers and the availability of resources, it is 
possible to make programs such as Agrastability, Growing Forward II, and advance payments 
under the Agricultural Marketing Programs Act
387
 dependent on the agricultural producer 
implementing best management practices. In some instances, tying agricultural aid and subsidies 
to the practice of environmentally sustainable practices may be administratively burdensome. For 
example, until the contracts/programs expire, monitoring and random inspections of the lands 
and management practices will be required. However, in some cases, tying aid to 
environmentally sustainable practices will be worthwhile. A program, for example, which 
distributes money to land managers in a flood-prone region may be dependant on the land 
manager not disturbing wetlands or returning land to wetlands. Tying agricultural aid to 
environmentally sustainable practices should be examined on a program-by-program basis.  
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5.0.5 Ownership of Lands by the Public 
 Publically owned lands can produce numerous environmental benefits.
388
 Community 
pasture lands in the prairies are an example of a successful instance of where government 
ownership was required to prevent environmental disaster. AAFC‘s Community Pasture Program 
was created in the 1930 to purchase privately held lands with the goal of reclaiming badly eroded 
areas and managing marginal rangelands.
389
 Currently, one of the Community Pasture Program‘s 
two objectives is to ―manage a productive, bio-diverse rangeland and promote environmentally 
responsible land use practices‖.390 It appears that the Community Pasture Program is achieving 
its objective; the pastures, among the most degraded land in the prairies in the 1930s, have been 
described as ―pristine environment on a large contiguous tract of land.‖391 Kulshreshtha notes 
that, as community pastures are under better management than privately held lands, they 
normally sequester larger amounts of carbon than neighbouring lands.
392
 Further, community 
pastures cost very little for the governments to administer. For example, in 2005-06, the 
Government of Canada contributed $8.8 million dollars to the Community Pasture Program.
393
 
User fees and non-fee revenue (such as oil and gas leases) provided the remaining $15 million 
required to operate the community pasture program.
394
 The public‘s contribution can be 
considered both a subsidized payment for environmental services and a subsidized payment for 
social benefits.
395
 Private property was not created in carbon assets to achieve the sequestration 
benefits derived from the management of public lands.  
 
5.0.6 Conclusion 
 Approaches which do not include the creation of private property in carbon assets have a 
proven history of success. For example, the Permanent Cover Program and scientific innovations 
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leading to the development of conservation tillage have encouraged the sequestration of carbon 
and the protection of carbon sinks. Carbon markets using private property in carbon assets, on 
the other hand, have not had the same success. Not only are there legal, administrative, social, 
and environmental reasons to abandon private property rights in carbon assets, but there may be 
legal, administrative, social, and environmental reasons to further explore the options for 
encouraging carbon sequestration on agricultural land provided above.  
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 By creating property in carbon assets, legislators are promoting above business-as-usual 
sequestration. For example, it is hoped that, instead of just practicing conservation tillage to 
increase soil biomass sinks, the ability to sell carbon credits will entice farmers to participate in 
agroforesty, forested land generally being a larger carbon sink than agricultural land. The goal of 
legislators is admirable: engaging hundreds of thousands of land managers in above business-as-
usual carbon sequestration activities on an ongoing basis would significantly reduce the 
reduction of the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere.  
 Economic theory argues that property in carbon assets transferable in a market will make 
the creation of carbon sinks a consideration in land management decisions. Further, by restricting 
emitters‘ ability to emit and requiring emitters to purchase a ―right‖ to emit above their regulated 
standards, emitters will not only be financing sequestration activities, but the price of carbon may 
also lure emitters into discontinuing unnecessary emissions and/or transitioning to lower-
emissions technology.  
 As seen by the last two paragraphs, legislators are attempting to use property in carbon to 
realize an environmental initiative. While property and property rules have been, and can be, 
used to give effect to social programs, in the case of climate change, the environmental policy 
has not been properly constructed. Private property in carbon assets, the tool by which 
governments hope to achieve success, is not justifiable. If the tool governments are using to 
achieve a solution to climate change is not acting in the predicted or desired manner in any 
sustainable way, those climate change policies will not be successful, and may even have 
undesired adverse impacts.  
 Private property in carbon assets is not acting in a sustainable or predictable manner as 
natural cycles, including the carbon cycle, are not the appropriate subjects of private property. 
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Carbon assets represent the portion of the carbon cycle where carbon can be and is stored as 
organic molecules in organisms and as organic matter in soil. It is a founding proposition of 
property law that the ―spontaneous hand of nature‖ is not rightly propertized.396 
 The intrinsic nature of the carbon cycle defeats any private property rights legislators 
may attempt to assign to carbon. The carbon cycle lacks permanence, as well as the ability to be 
sufficiently defined, identified and assumed. The corresponding property rights would also suffer 
from the same deficiencies. How, for example, will property rights be able to accurately capture 
and represent the ongoing process of dead plant and animal matter increasing the carbon content 
of soil, thus creating a carbon sink? There are too many variables in this process for the 
associated property rights to exist with any degree of certainty; the amount of carbon released 
into the atmosphere from decaying organisms and the amount of carbon stored in soils depend on 
the availability of microorganisms, soil conditions and soil types, weather, soil moisture, and 
numerous other factors. It simply is not possible to adequately define, identify, quantify, or 
transfer rights to this uncertain natural process. Rights would continuously spontaneously be 
created and destroyed through no action of the rights holder.  
 It is also not possible to physically, legally, or morally exclude strangers from the carbon 
cycle, exclusivity being a key feature of ownership.
397
 Society benefits from carbon sequestration 
activities by the consequential reduction of the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide. 
Thus, property rights in carbon assets cannot be structured in a way which excludes strangers 
from the benefits of this resource, nor would society, based on collective mores, desire to do so.  
 Yet, legislators have created and are creating private property in carbon assets. Canada, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec have all created or 
shown an interest in creating private property rights in carbon assets. Further, through human 
interference, humans are actively managing a portion of the carbon cycle. As such, even though 
property rights in the carbon cycle may not be considered appropriate pursuant to the works of 
theorists Locke, Gray, and Wilberforce, it is necessary to examine whether property theory is 
able to justify private property rights in carbon assets.  
 Private property in carbon assets will be considered appropriate if any of the common 
theories used to justify private property can justify private property in carbon assets. Utilitarian 
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theory is unable to show how society is best served by creating private property rights in carbon 
assets to deal with a complex, multifaceted issue. As seen by deforestation in Africa, the solution 
to climate change may require numerous community-focused strategies. The personal self-
assertion and special rights theories justify the norm—either non-property or common property 
in carbon assets. Economic theory is unable to justify private property in carbon assets as carbon 
assets are not scarce, thus intrinsically valueless. The principles of labour theory, however, may 
be a reason to justify private property in carbon assets; legislators‘ intent in creating private 
property in carbon assets is to deliberately manage the carbon cycle by promoting carbon 
sequestration activities, and thus the labour to carry out those activities.  
 Offset markets relying on private property are failing because private property rights in 
carbon assets are unable to achieve subsistence, equality, abundance, and security. Ultimately, 
the thesis find that private property in carbon assets is not justifiable pursuant to the theory of 
labour as private property in carbon assets jeopardizes security of food and food production, is 
administratively wasteful, and is not the approach which will achieve the greatest environmental 
success.  
 Carbon offset markets cannot be altered in a way which will lead to their success. 
Markets and legislators are incorrectly advancing or describing carbon assets as private property. 
First, the description of carbon assets as private property changes the characterization of climate 
change from an environmental problem to a property problem. Second, the historically created 
rules of property are not capable of dealing with a complex issue connected to culpable human 
behaviours which alter a natural cycle. Finally, the description of climate change as a ―property 
problem‖ alters associated relationships. By creating and / or accepting private property and 
carbon markets, legislators have given up the ability to guide the evolution of carbon policy.  
 However, there are tools useful in mitigating the effects of climate change which do not 
involve the creation of private property rights in carbon assets. For example, investment in 
scientific research, creating programs to target at-risk areas, and the public ownership of critical 
lands have all been previously successful in promoting and protecting carbon sinks. These 
options should be further considered to determine whether they are able to meet society‘s goals 
in relation to encouraging and protecting biotic carbon sinks.  
Private property rights in carbon assets are not working. Abandoning private property in 
carbon sinks and carbon offset markets, and redirecting these resources to other programs, will 
92 
 
increase the likelihood of society achieving its social and environmental goals in relation to 
carbon sequestration and sink protection. Thus, this thesis recommends that governments do not 
proclaim, but discourage markets from recognizing private property rights in carbon assets due to 
the potential negative social and environmental consequences of private property existing in the 
carbon cycle.  
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